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Abstract 
This paper investigates the risks and risk mitigation techniques which are in use within the
Luxembourg-based payment and securities settlement systems and evaluates what could be the
impact of risk analysis on central bank oversight. It indicates how overseers can make use of
different tools to assess the availability and appropriateness of risk mitigation techniques
implemented by market practitioners and to further promptly react in case of contingency. 
34
Executive summary
The risks, which arise within payment and securities settlement systems, can be of different
nature and different can be their probability of materialisation. Overseers are particularly
concerned about the occurrence of systemic risk and all other risks which might, directly or
indirectly constitute a threat to financial stability. Hence overseers attach importance to
assessing how systems' operators and technical agents currently mitigate the exposures which
arise within the systems
1 they operate.
Due to the fact that risks can be different within payment or securities settlement systems, the
mitigation techniques implemented by risk-takers, such as operators and technical agents, can
be varied. Risk-takers can be confronted with the need to find a balance between their business
needs, the market demand and the risk-adverse attitude adopted by overseers. Hence their
capability to fully mitigate risks might need to be seen in the light of what would theoretically
represent a first best solution under a risk-adverse attitude, on one hand, and what currently
represents best practice on the market on the other hand. The first chapter of the study
provides a description of the different systems' exposures followed by an explanation of the
scope of the respective mitigation techniques and the way they are currently implemented
within the Luxembourg environment. In this context, Clearstream Banking Luxembourg
operates the Luxembourg-based securities settlement system, while LIPS-Gross and LIPS-Net
represent the Luxembourg payment systems. 
The evaluation of exposures and of the availability and appropriateness of risk mitigation
techniques is an exercise which overseers, for their part, might undertake continuously. Hence,
the second chapter describes an oversight framework which can be applied indifferently to
payment and to securities settlement systems. The tools, which are described in the text, have
been shaped in such a way as to assess both exposures and mitigation mechanisms. Their aim
is to:
(a) enable an understanding of existing risks in the context of payment and securities
settlement systems and to foresee possible future exposures which might arise from
systems' developments or external threats. Tools which satisfy this aim can be defined as
research tools;
(b) enable the assessment of the availability and appropriateness of risk mitigation mechanisms
currently in use on the market. Tools which satisfy this aim can be defined as assessment
tools; 
(c) enable overseers to react promptly in case of contingency and to contribute, when possible,
to a timely reduction of the costs incurred by counterparts after an exposure has
materialised. Tools which satisfy this aim can be defined as intervention tools and/or
procedures.
.
1 When made use of the word "system" in the text, it refers to both payment and securities settlement systems.5
The use of the different instruments is interconnected. Research tools permit systematically the
gaining of a wide understanding of the threats arising from the financial market and the
achievement of knowledge about the vulnerabilities within a system. The result of such research
enables the dynamic identification of the roots of exposures, the assessment, in turn, of
whether the risk mitigation techniques adopted by overseen systems might be adequate and if
current mitigation mechanisms could cover new threats which are in the process of
development. This evaluation permits to shape at best the procedures and the intervention
mechanisms to be used by overseers in case of crisis and contingency. 
Hence, the aim of assessing risks and risk mitigation techniques in the context of central bank
oversight of payment and securities settlement systems can be defined as an ongoing process
which finds its major root in the developments overseen systems are subject to and finds one
of its major ”raisons d’être” in the developments overseers might achieve in terms of safety and
efficiency within the systems they oversee.Index
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91 Introduction
The risks which arise in payment and securities settlement systems - SSS
2 - can be of different
nature and different also can be the mitigation techniques which are implemented by
operators
3 and technical agents
4 to mitigate them. Due to the fact that the link between
payment and securities settlement systems is increasing, overseers might need to develop a
general framework which could easily help them to assess exposures and mitigation
mechanisms in both, payment and securities settlement systems.
Furthermore, the philosophy behind risk assessment has been slightly changing recently; the
emphasis is, among other factors, less on risk measurement but increasingly on the
communication with the risk-takers. Hence, operators and technical agents might be overseen
according to their awareness of risks, their capability to mitigate exposures
5 and their ability to
adapt quickly to changing environments.
The purpose of overseers in assessing risks and risk management is, among other factors, to
contribute to the identification and prevention of those risks which could arise in payment and
securities settlement systems and of those risks the operator and/or technical agent is exposed
to by virtue of its activities, followed by the evaluation of the availability and adequacy of the
risk mitigation techniques used by overseen entities. One of overseers' priorities in this context
is, among others, to enforce the reduction of systemic risk
6. As a direct effect of risk mitigation,
confidence of the counterparts in the payment and securities market can be promoted.
The process has its major focus not only on the operator or the technical agent themselves, but
might include also the parent company as the subsidiaries, branches and representative offices,
where they have a bearing on risk and potentially an impact on payment, payment-related
systems or SSSs and financial stability.
10
.
2 In the paper the term SSS is broadly used and defines systems which settle securities transactions and which can be embedded with 
payment system to settle the cash leg of securities transactions.
3 An operator has been defined in BCL's Policy and Procedures for the Oversight of payments and securities settlement systems as the
"central system organisation providing products and services and the owner of the system".
4 A technical agent has been defined in BCL's Policy and Procedures as "a supplier of service where an operator has located a significant
portion of its operational or IT infrastructure or where several payment- or securities settlement-related operational or IT infrastructures
are centralised". 
5 The term "exposure" is used as synonym for "risk".
6 Systemic risk has been defined in BCL's Policy and Procedures as "the inability of one institution to meet its obligations when due will
cause other institutions to fail to meet their obligations when due. The possibility that the liquidity and credit problems precipitated
by these failures to perform will disrupt financial markets and impair the functioning of payment and settlement operators is of
particular concern".2 Risks and risk mitigation techniques
The possibility that a transaction might not be settled as expected or not settled is usually
defined as settlement risk and comprises the occurrence of several other types of exposures.
Overseers are particularly concerned about the occurrence of systemic risk and all other risks,
which may constitute, directly or indirectly, a threat to financial stability
7. 
Within payment and securities settlement systems, the risks and the mitigation techniques
involved are of different nature. The exposures treated in this chapter represent only a limited
group of risks which have been mostly treated in literature
8 and which are, to a large degree,
highly interrelated one to the other. Other risks do nevertheless exist.
The chapter sets out a short description of risks
9 and mitigation techniques in securities settlement
and payment systems respectively, followed by a short explanation of the scope and use of the
mitigation mechanism and its main implementation within the Luxembourg environment. 
The settlement of securities transactions involves the processing of two legs of the same
operation; the securities and the cash leg. Hence, the risks which arise in this context, partly
relate to the processing of securities and partly to the processing of the funds, while the risks
which arise within payment systems mostly relate to fund transfers. For this reason, securities
settlement systems have been treated in the text as the first issue. Clearstream Banking
Luxembourg - CBL - operates the Luxembourg-based securities settlement system, while LIPS-
Gross and LIPS-Net are the Luxembourg payment systems which have been analysed in the
context.
2 2. .1 1   S Se ec cu ur ri it ti ie es s   s se et tt tl le em me en nt t   s sy ys st te em ms s   - -   S SS SS Ss s   - -
2.1.1 Legal risk
2.1.1.1 Definition
Legal risk occurs when:
- a counterpart might suffer a loss because relevant laws or regulations do not support the rules
of the system in which it participates; 
11
.
7 The vast interrelationships between payments' and SSSs' participants raised concerns after the first counterpart failure, which triggered
systemic risk. A major example has been the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt on the 26th June 1974. On that day the Bundesaufsichtsamt
fuer das Kreditwesen withdrew the banking license of Herstatt, a small bank in Cologne, which was active in the foreign exchange
market, and ordered the liquidation of the institution during the banking day at the close of the interbank system in Germany. Prior
to the announcement of the failure, several counterparts of Herstatt had irrevocably paid DEM to Herstatt through the German
payment system against receipts of US$ later during the day in New York in respect of maturing transactions. When Herstatt business
was terminated during the day, Herstatt's New York correspondents suspended outgoing US$ payments from Herstatt's account. This
left Herstatt's counterpart banks exposed for the full value of DEM payments made (credit exposure). Those counterparts, which had
entered into forward trades with Hestatt not yet due for settlement, incurred in the loss of replacing the contracts on the market
(replacement risk).
8 General literature in this filed usually involves the "Core Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems" (BIS; January 2001),
"Recommendations for securities settlement systems" (BIS; November 2001) and the "Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting
Schemes of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries" (BIS; November 1990).
9 The definitions of the different risks which are given in this chapter are taken from the BCL's Policy and Procedures for the Oversight
of payments and securities settlement systems, 5 December 2001.- the application of the relevant laws and regulations is uncertain; or
- the system is not adequately protected against crime, terrorism and money laundering
activities.
The exposure itself arises with the finalisation of the trade and lasts until the counterparts have
discharged their bilateral obligations.
2.1.1.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
One of the basic principles in order to ensure a reduction of legal risk is to achieve clarity on a
number of issues which might have, directly or indirectly, a significant impact on the
functioning, safety and efficiency of the system. As a general rule, the major issues are:
- timing of finality of the transaction and of irrevocability of the transfer order
10;
- relevance of national and foreign laws which may be applicable to the overseen system and
relevance of participants' home jurisdictions;
- nature of the entitlement to securities held in the system; 
- level of enforceability of risk management measures
11;
- bilateral/multilateral obligations of systems' operator, technical agent and participants;
- to ensure the traceability of transaction orders
12 etc.. 
2.1.1.3 Situation in Luxembourg
The legal and regulatory framework of CBL, the Luxembourg-based SSS, is defined by European
legislation
13, by national laws
14 and by CBL's General Terms and Conditions (which are governed
by Luxembourg law). The legal competence of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg - BCL - in
the field of the oversight of payment and securities settlement systems is laid down in the
national law of 12 January 2001
15 implementing the Directive 98/26/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities
settlement systems, into the Law of 5 April 1993 relating to the financial sector, as amended.
In addition BCL's competence in the field of payment systems results from the European
Community's legislation
16. BCL's responsibilities as concern the promotion of the smooth
operation of payments and securities settlement systems and hence the stability and integrity
12
.
10 According to the transposition of the Settlement Finality Directive into Luxembourg law of 12 January 2001, the point of irrevocability
corresponds to the point of entry of a transaction order into the system.
11 As general rule, risk management measures are enforceable to the extent they are covered through sound contractual agreements.
12 Important in the context is the circular BCL 2002/172 of 28 June 2002 ("Protection des systèmes de paiement et de règlement des
opérations sur titres contre le crime et le terrorisme").
13 European legislation involves the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the
ECB. Furthermore a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in
Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union has been endorsed by the Governing Council on 18 January 2001.
14 The major national laws relevant in this context are: (i) the law of 12 January 2001, implementing the EU's settlement finality directive,
which gives the BCL formal responsibilities for payment and securities settlement systems and (ii) the law of 1 August 2001, pertaining
to the circulation of securities and other fungible instruments. The competence of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg in this field is
furthermore laid down in the circular BCL 2001/163 of 23 February 2001 ("La surveillance par la Banque centrale des systèmes de
paiement et de règlement des opérations sur titres au Luxembourg") and the circular BCL 2001/168 of 5 December 2001 ("Politique
et procédures en matière de surveillance des systèmes de paiement et de règlement des opérations sur titres au Luxembourg"). The
circulars can be found at www.bcl.lu.
15 Published in Mémorial A-n°16 of 6 February 2001.
16 Article 105 of the EC Treaty and articles 3 and 22 of the Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the European Central Bank.of the financial infrastructure, are set out in BCL's Policy and Procedures. Its institutional and
legal responsibilities are furthermore extensively laid down in BCL's circular 2000/163 of 23
February 2001 "La surveillance par la Banque centrale des systèmes de paiement et de
règlement des opérations sur titres au Luxembourg" as in the Bulletin 2002/2 "Stabilité
financière"
17. 
In the event of participants' insolvency, Luxembourg bankruptcy law protects the holder of
securities. His property rights, in fact, remain unaffected in case of default of the operator of
the securities settlement system. The book-entry procedure
18 confers to the holder of the
securities account at CBL the ownership right over the securities booked on it. This right
consists:
- of a claim on a given number of non-individually identified securities of the same type held
by the central securities depository on behalf of the community of all owners of the same type
of securities; and 
- of a right to reclaim them in the event of insolvency of the SSS. 
The potential for cross-jurisdictional conflicts is partly covered by the "lex rei sitae principle",
which stipulates that the applicable jurisdiction as regards bearer notes is the one of the place
where the securities are located (i.e. for notes deposited in CBL it corresponds to Luxembourg
law). Due to the mobile nature of bearer notes and of dematerialised securities in general, this
principle often becomes contestable. On these grounds a preliminary convention on "The law
applicable to certain rights in respect of securities held with an intermediary" is under
preparation
19. Under this convention, the law applicable to proprietary rights in securities is the
law of the State where the account holder maintains a securities account and where the
relevant intermediary in a system (e.g. CBL) has an office engaged in a business or activity of
maintaining securities accounts
20. This principle is known under the name of PRIMA (P Place of
the R Relevant I Interm mediary A Approach). 
Further within this framework, a specific working group, the ESCB - CESR
21 Working Group, has
been created as forum of discussion between central banks and securities regulators to define




17 Publications relating to the institutional competences of the BCL can be found on www.bcl.lu.
18 The Grand-Ducal Règlement of 17 February 1971 provided the statutory basis for book-entry custody, clearing and settlement of
securities and defined the interest of an investor in securities held through accounts with a financial intermediary in Luxembourg as a
right of ownership. The law of 1 August 2001 on mobilisation of securities (article 6) replaced the Decree of 1971 and defines the
proprietary rights as "real and incorporeal rights" of ownership on behalf of the investor over the pool of assets. Clearstream Services
(CS) currently operates the book-entry system on behalf of CBL.
19 The draft convention is under preparation by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
20 Article 4(1)-(2).
21 C Committee of E European S Securities R Regulators.2.1.2 Credit risk
2.1.2.1 Definition
Credit risk represents the possibility that a counterpart does not fulfil its obligations for the full
value, either on the due date or at any time thereafter and can be sub-divided in replacement
cost risk and principal risk. 
Replacement cost risk, i.e. the risk of unrealised gains on unsettled contracts with a defaulting
participant, relates to the possibility that the counterpart defaults before any transfer of
securities has been carried out. The exposure arises when the original transaction becomes
legally binding and lasts until the respective counterpart has discharged its obligations. 
Principal risk relates to the possibility that the counterpart defaults once the transfer of funds
or securities has begun but has not been completed yet. The exposure arises when one party in
the transaction has fulfilled its obligations (payment or transfer of securities) and lasts until the
counterpart has fulfilled its respective obligations.
2.1.2.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
The creation of a central counterparty - CCP - reduces counterpart credit risk. This institution
provides for the novation of the original contracts by substituting itself as respective
counterpart. From a market participant point of view, counterpart credit risk is substituted by
the risk of default of the CCP. Due to the fact that CCPs implement strong risk mitigation
techniques, their probability of default is usually less than the one of market participants. 
Countries, which do not have a CCP, implement other mitigation techniques to cover credit risk,
such as the reduction of the settlement cycle (the period ranging from the trade execution to
the settlement). The longer the settlement cycle, the greater will be the risk that one
counterpart will become insolvent or default on its obligations. This, in turn, will increase the
replacement cost risk if the price of the security transacted might diverge from the original
price. Usually
22, the maximum acceptable timeframe is represented by a delay of three business
days after the trade date to settle the cash transaction. Different markets may have different
practices in use. Depending on the costs of reducing settlement cycles and on the benefits in
terms of risk reduction, different instruments can have different settlement cycles. 
Delivery versus payment mechanisms - DvP - furthermore mitigates credit risk by linking a
payment system and an SSS to ensure the irrevocable and simultaneous exchange of securities
against cash. However this mechanism can either eliminate replacement cost risk nor liquidity




22 The Group of Thirty's 1989 recommendations regarding securities clearance and settlement require that final settlement of cash
transactions should occur on t+3, which means three business days after the trade date (recommendation 7). 
23 BIS, Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries, Cross-border securities
settlement, March 1995.- model 1 DvP
24 settles transfer instructions for both securities and funds on a trade-by-trade
basis (transfer of securities is final simultaneously to the transfer of funds);
- model 2 DvP
25 settles securities instructions on a gross basis (the transfer of securities is final
immediately), while funds instructions are settled on a net basis (the transfer of funds is final
at the end of the processing cycle);
- model 3 DvP
26 settles transfer instructions for both securities and funds on a net basis with
final transfer of both at the end of the last settlement cycle. During the processing day, the
securities transfers are marked as provisional until the cash settlement is completed later
during the day. 
Risks in this context can arise from the link between SSSs using different models of DvP. If a
model 1 DvP is receiving securities from a model 3 DvP, transfers in the books of the former are
final immediately when processed, while transfers in the books of model 3 DvP may remain
provisional for many hours after they have been processed. The exposure increases when the
transfer to a participant in model 1 DvP is considered as final and the system is granting credit
on the basis of the collateral received. Due to the fact that in a model 3 DvP unwind can be
permitted in case of a participant's default to settle cash obligations, the corresponding
securities transfer might be unwound with possible effects on the participants in model 1 DvP. 
Further mitigation techniques are:
- the implementation of a loss-sharing arrangement between participants;
- the existence of a guarantor syndicate composed by a group of banks;
- the possibility of realising collateral when a participant becomes insolvent;
- insurance coverage, etc..
SSSs which, in order to enable a smooth settlement of securities transactions, might grant credit
to their customers on the basis of internal credit ratings assigned to customer institutions rather
than on their available collateral, might raise additional risk concerns. The belief that the
creditworthiness of a customer institution can transform an unacceptable risk into an
acceptable one, a result which no amount of collateral could in principle achieve, and an
eventual granting of unsecured credit lines on a short-term basis for creditworthy customers,
could however be considered as non-consistent with the general philosophy expressed by
international standards according to which clean credit risk should be eliminated through the
use of full collateralisation.
Unsecured credit lines
Potential reasons which could lead SSSs to grant unsecured credit lines might be:
- The existence of SSSs' night-time processing;
SSSs might give customers the possibility to settle transactions during day-time as night-time
15
.
24 SSSs settling via model 1 DvP: CBL (Luxemburg), EOC (Belgium), CREST (UK), etc..
25 SSSs settling via model 2 DvP: APK (Finland), Clearstream Banking Frankfurt (Germany) operates model 2 DvP, but has nevertheless a
procedure available for participants who want to use model 1 DvP, etc..
26 SSSs settling via model 3 DvP: Bank of Greece Securities Settlement System (Greece), Interbolsa (Portugal), Vaerdipapircentralen
(Denmark) gives the possibility to settle via model 1 and model 3 DvP, etc..processing cycles. Participants might need to use heavily unsecured credit lines during the
night-time processing (intra-day). As result of this need the end-of-day figures on the use of
those lines might result as relatively low, even if their use intra-day might have been relatively
high.
- The way credit lines are granted;
A further reason why unsecured credit lines might be inflated could depend on the way those
lines are granted. Indeed, credit lines can be granted for each customer or for each settlement
account. In the latter case if customers have more than one account, those lines could be in
excess of the real needs.
- The cross-border settlement activities of SSSs;
For SSSs with significant cross-border settlement activities, the differences between the
operating hours of SSSs/Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) and the differences between
settlement practices (e.g. finality rules, cut-off times, etc.) of national payment systems and
local CSDs, might require SSSs to grant credit extensions of large amounts and for a certain
duration to participants, in order to reduce the opportunity cost of maintaining cash and
securities balances to meet settlement obligations. This opportunity cost is usually
represented by a loss of days in value.
Inter-bank placements
SSSs might have in place a network of cash correspondents through which the settlement of
the cash leg of securities transactions is performed. Participants need usually to provision their
cash accounts in order to settle their operations and at the end of the business day, depending
on the treasury management of the different participants in a system, more or less significant
amounts of funds might be left on the participants' cash accounts at the operators' cash
correspondent network. In this context, the operator has the possibility, through an active
treasury management, to invest this liquidity overnight on the inter-bank market. Cash left by
single participants on their respective accounts might be of negligible amounts, nevertheless
the sum of all funds left overnight by the totality of the participants in a system might represent
a significant amount, which invested, might represent an additional income for the operator of
the system. 
Concerns within this context arise if it is considered that inter-bank placements might entail a
credit risk which is proportionate to the creditworthiness of the banks chosen by the operator
to place its participants' overnight funds it has at disposal. The operator has therefore a credit
risk towards its placement banks and an exposure towards its participants because it is liable
towards them for returning their funds at the start at the next business day. The analysis of
inter-bank placement risk achieves therefore importance as concerns credit exposures within
SSSs.
162.1.2.3 Situation in Luxembourg
At the time the characteristics of the national financial market does not seem to justify the
implementation of a CCP:
- transactions' volumes and values are low;
- volumes and turnover of derivatives traded on the stock exchange are currently limited, which
does not justify the implementation of a CCP to minimise the use of collateral; 
- as a general rule the settlement facility is provided by CBL which supplies pre-settlement
matching of trade transactions;
- the stock exchange has operated an automatic trading system since 1996 (Système
Automatisé de Marché). Orders are matched electronically and participants do not have the
possibility to choose their counterpart in the deal, which might reduce their capability to
mitigate credit risk. Nevertheless, stock exchange members operate under the common rules
of the exchange
27 , which foresee sanctions in case of members' non-compliance.
Concerning the settlement cycle, CBL operates a multiple batch processing procedure (free of
payment - FOP -) for Eurosystems' credit operations purposes, while it uses DvP settlement in
commercial bank money for other settlement procedures. The multi-batch process allows a
shortening of the settlement cycle and as result, the system receives and processes trade
confirmations from the different markets several times during the day. The date on which the
settlement instruction will be processed depends on the type of transaction
28. 
Due to the fact that CBL operates a model 1 DvP system, which implies that the transfers of
securities and funds become final
29 simultaneously in the books of CBL (on the buyer's and
seller's account), participants are not exposed to credit risk. In the event of a counterpart's
default, CBL would block all the accounts of the concerned participant, so that no further
settlement of transactions will be possible. Customers would nevertheless remain exposed to a
change in value of the securities that should have been delivered against the agreed transaction
price, which is in turn mitigated by the application of haircuts. Furthermore, in order to cover
credit risk, the following controls are undertaken internally by CBL:
- CBL never acts as principal to securities transactions;
- access criteria are based on the creditworthiness of the participant;
- customer ratings are reviewed yearly by an Internal Credit Group;
- collateral valuation is performed daily;
17
.
27 Règlement d'ordre intérieur de la Bourse de Luxembourg, Chapter VIII, IX, X.
28 Bridge transactions are processed in the overnight cycle for the required settlement date and internal transactions are processed in the
day-time settlement cycle for the required settlement date. For settling receipt of securities from a foreign counterpart, the crediting
of the security and the debiting of cash in CBL is done upon confirmation of settlement in the domestic market.
29 Irrevocability is achieved when the parties can no longer revoke their instruction and unconditionality when there are no longer any
circumstances that could cause the SSS to unwind the transfer. If transfers are provisional at the time of processing, even if DvP is
achieved, the risk remains that transfers may have to be unwound later if finality cannot be achieved. In a transaction between two
accounts of CBL's system, the finality occurs during the next settlement cycle, while for a bridge transaction, the transfer becomes
final at the time the SSS, which is delivering securities, receives the other SSS's feedback transmission accepting the proposed delivery.
For links with other SSSs the transfers of funds and securities become final in accordance with the local rules of the foreign domestic
markets.- a loss-sharing arrangement is present. CBL reserves the right to reverse any erroneous debit
or credit entries to any account at any time. Such errors shall include a debit or credit made
in connection with a transaction which becomes subject to a reversed order. Losses in a
collective holding of a particular class of securities are to be borne jointly and pro-rata by the
co-owners of the collective holding on the basis of the credit balance existing at the time
where the loss occurred;
- in the event that the customer has a debit balance in a security, which can only occur in the
case of an unwind, and he does not credit the account within seven business days, CBL may
purchase collateral on the market at the expense of the defaulting customer. 
Credit evaluation process
The Internal Credit Group (ICG) is a sub-committee of the Group Executive Management
30. Its
approval is required for all credit proposals, admission of new customers, setting of credit lines
and changes to them, setting or changing limits to exposures on any counterpart as for the
appointment of depositories and cash correspondents. The ICG is also responsible for periodic
reviews of credit lines and limits to exposures as further for the review of products and
operational issues which might trigger credit implications. The Credit Advisory Group, whose
members are representatives of international banks having expertise in credit analysis and
monitoring particular geographical areas, advises the ICG. Only the Credit Unit can define or
alter the credit parameters which are defined for customer's accounts within Clearstream
Banking.
As concerns admission of participants to the system, access is granted for a number of
institutional types which are listed in the credit policy guidelines of CBL, while ineligibility is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
Provision and collateral checks
The provision of collateral is required for: 
- all settlements in which CBL extends credit to customers, except for non-collateralised credit
facilities;
- securities borrowing and lending facilities (see section "securities lending facilities" 2.1.3.3
for details);




30 Clearstream Banking, Disclosure Framework Report, BIS-IOSCO Disclosure Framework for Securities Settlement Systems, The
Clearstream Banking S.A. Luxembourg Response, 3.2002.The Securities Lending and Borrowing Syndicate - SLBGS
31 - ultimately evaluates and bears the
underlying country, currency and issuer risks of collateral eligible in CBL's system according to
eligibility criteria, such as the size of the issue, its currency of denomination, its liquidity or its
volatility. At the beginning of the settlement process, the system re-evaluates the outstanding
exposures and collateral available based on which securities are deposited in the account and
on the market price of the security. CBL agrees with the syndicate, which securities are eligible
and which haircut
32 to apply. 
Provision and collateral checks are performed by the system during the processing. The former
ensures that securities and cash are available on the participants' account or through securities
borrowing and credit facilities, while collateral checks ensure that sufficient collateral is
available to cover outstanding obligations. Indeed when evaluating the collateral available in an
account to secure a certain exposure, CBL takes into account:
- which securities are available in the customer's account and eligible to secure transactions for
settlement;
- the market price of the security;
- the exchange rate, where relevant; and
- the haircut to be applied to the security.
If the exposure resulting from the instructed transactions were in excess of the exposure which
can be secured by the collateral available in the account, the transaction would not settle.
2.1.3 Liquidity risk
2.1.3.1 Definition
Liquidity risk arises virtually in every settlement distress scenario. Both parties in a trade might
be exposed to it on the settlement date, but in different ways. This risk includes the possibility
that the seller/buyer of a security who does not receive payment/delivery in due time (for the
full or the partial value) may have to borrow or liquidate assets to fulfil its obligation. The costs
associated with it, depend on the liquidity of the markets in which the security is needed and
are inversely proportioned to it. The exposure arises at the start of the transaction settlement
date and lasts until the settlement has taken place during the day.
In the absence of a direct link between SSSs and payment systems or embedded payment
systems, the occurrence of liquidity risk is more likely. As the execution of a transaction may be
dependent from settlement of other trades, this, in turn, may prevent other participants from
meeting their obligations (gridlock). 
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31 Citibank, UBS, Dexia, BGL, BBL, Kredietbank SA and NV, HSBC-CCF currently compose the SLBGS.
32 Cash is accepted with a 0% haircut; commercial papers with 5-10% haircut; zero coupon bonds with 20% haircut; equities with 34%
haircut.2.1.3.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
Securities lending or borrowing permit the reduction of liquidity as credit risk. Borrowing
securities might in fact be more cost-effective than bearing the cost associated with a
settlement failure. On the other hand borrower and lender face the risk that securities lent
might not be returned when due
33. Those facilities partly shift credit risk from the counterpart
in the original transaction to the lender/borrower (outside the original transaction), who, in case
of default, might need to acquire the securities on the market at higher costs. 
Intra-day credit, from its part, is often extended to participants in order to ensure timely
settlement and avoid gridlock. It is usually provided by the Central Securities Depository as
principal and takes the form of intra-day loans or repurchase agreements. 
Beside the supply of lending or borrowing facilities and of intra-day credit, in order to provide
for additional liquidity for settlement purposes to participants, the operator of an SSS might
consider the possibility to enable customers to pre-advise the entry of funds from cash
correspondents for credit to a customer's account held at the operator itself. This methodology
involves the risk that the pre-advised funds might not be paid as advised, which in turn might
have an impact on the treasury management of the system's operator. Indeed, the procedure
enables customer to be credited with good value, nevertheless a non-receipt of funds would
impact the operator's funds position towards its cash correspondents.
Especially in contingency situations, a system's operator might be faced with the need to
mitigate liquidity risk and would therefore rely on a liquidity contingency plan. The latter could
include for example, revolving credit facilities or, the possibility to issue commercial papers to
raise additional liquidity on the market. Due to the fact that raising liquidity on the market is
interlinked with the rating a company has, a downgrade in the rating of a system's operator
would imply not only a reputational damage but also a reduction in its capability to raise
additional liquidity in contingency situations.
2.1.3.3 Situation in Luxembourg
Final funds transfers are made in CBL's system as debits and credits to customer's cash accounts
which CBL holds via a network of correspondent banks on behalf of its customers. In order to
minimise settlement failures, CBL provides automatic securities lending programmes and credit
facilities: 
- for settling purposes;
- within the limits of the customer's credit facilities; and 
- fully collateralised (with the exception of unsecured credit lines). 
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33 Because of counterpart's default, operational failure, etc..A syndicate of guarantors establishes limits on securities lending and CBL itself sets placement
limits for major banks.
Securities lending facilities
A securities loan is an agreement in which securities are lent to a counterpart against cash or
other collateral, to avoid participants' settlement failure. CBL merely acts as an intermediary
between lenders and borrowers and manages three major different types of securities lending
programmes: 
- Automated Securities Lending (ASL);
- Disclosed Automated Securities Lending (DASL); and
- Strategic Securities Lending (SSL). 
Under the DASL and the ASL programmes, borrowers have access to a large pool of lenders;
whereas under the SSL, securities loans are transacted bilaterally between lenders and
borrowers. Within the ASL programme, the collateral provided by the borrowers is pledged to
a syndicate of guarantors, which in turn guarantees all securities loans, while CBL does not bear
any underlying risk. Within the DASL and SSL arrangement, collateral is directly pledged to the
lenders and the risk is borne by the customers. Lenders can specify to which borrowers they are
willing to lend and up to which limit.
CBL administers the repurchase transaction through the use of a Tripartite Repurchase Service,
which implies the transfer of the securities from the seller to the buyer against cash and the
agreement of the seller to repurchase the securities at a specified time in the future or on
demand at a pre-defined price
34. CBL:
- performs eligibility checks to review if the securities correspond to the agreement;
- calculates the cash countervalue of securities;
- performs the matching and the settlement of the transaction; 
- makes margin calls if needed and checks that each party fulfils its obligations.
Credit facilities
Credit facilities supplied by CBL to its customer base are made available to participants at CBL's
discretion and can therefore be cancelled without prior notice. The facilities might also be
unavailable or restricted in less liquid currencies. There is a limit for the use of each facility. Two
major type of facilities can be supplied, such as; 
- Unconfirmed Funds Facility; and
- Technical Overdraft Facility.
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34 The reverse repurchase is the same transaction from the point of view of the buyer of securities.Unconfirmed funds can be used for settlement purposes in addition to an overdraft facility. The
facility is discretionary and the limit imposed represents the maximum amount of secured intra-
day credit available for each customer which is very much dependent on the financial standing
of the institution in whose name the account is opened. It covers intra-day exposures
35 where
CBL allows customers to use incoming cash for settlement purposes only, prior to confirmation
that CBL has received the cash. Unconfirmed funds are constituted on the basis of outstanding
pre-adviced instructions, i.e. a time-lag exists between the value date and the time when the
receipt of funds is confirmed by CBL's cash correspondent, and on the basis of instructions for
deliveries of securities against payment, i.e. a time-lag exists between the expected value date
of the funds to be received and the time when confirmation of settlement is received from the
depository. In case of a customer's default, his account will be blocked and he will be charged
a penalty interest. 
The Technical Overdraft Facility on the other hand permits highly rated customers to borrow
cash short-term
36. The goal is to finance customers' purchases in the event of unexpected
transaction failures which prevent them meeting their obligations. The credit line is usually fixed
in US$ but can eventually cover other currencies if agreed with the customer. 
In this context, CBL constantly supervises credit exposures and credit lines granted to its
customers.
Additional resources 
The objective of liquidity management is to ensure CBL's ability to meet all legitimate demand
for funds from depositories, all facilities committed to borrowers and to enable a smooth
settlement activity of participants' obligations. The liquidity management of CBL takes into
account, inter alia, pre-advised funds which are sent by customers on the basis of funds to be
received by CBL's cash correspondent banks -CCB -. Within this context, the CCB's network
37
manages the intra-day incoming and outgoing funds timing and performs the regular services
such as the execution of payments, receipts of funds, reporting through cash statements and
transaction reports, handling of claims and investigations and interest calculation. The CCBs
maintain intra-day and overnight credit lines to guarantee timely execution of CBL's payment
obligations to customers and other business partners (called uncommitted short inter-bank
lines). 
In contingency situations, Clearstream might need to raise additional funds. It disposes
therefore, inter alia, of the following major resources:
- uncommitted short inter-bank lines;
- Euro Commercial Programme -ECP- ;




35 The exposure lasts for 24 hours maximum.
36 The exposure lasts for 48 hours maximum.
37 The network involves currently around 70 cash correspondents and depositories. Only in the euro area CBL has 25 CCBs and
depositories.
38 The revolving credit facility is established for a stated period of time, but does not have a fixed repayment schedule. The borrower pays
a commitment fee to use the facility and may draw down the line at any time, or repay in full without penalty.Both the revolving credit facility and the ECP, a facility in which CBL issues commercial papers
to raise liquidity on the market, are considered as "last resort" measures. They are regularly
tested in order to ensure that the market reacts promptly to liquidity constraints; their use has
nevertheless to be approved internally.  
CBL has currently a short-term rating of A1+ and a long-term rating of AA+ from S&P and Fitch IBCA. 
The night-time link CBL/BCL
The development of the night-time link between CBL and BCL enables participants to request
that liquidity held at BCL be made available as collateral for credit granting during CBL's night-
time processing with Euroclear - EOC-. The goal is to increase the participants' liquidity
management possibilities
39. 
The results of the link processing are the following:
- collateral for the processing is provided in central bank money;
- participants have a better liquidity management because they have the possibility to use their
liquidity held at the central bank even overnight;
- participants potentially reduce on average their need to provision their cash accounts at CBL.
2.1.4 Risk of settlement bank failure
2.1.4.1 Definition
The settlement bank is the institution across whose books transactions are settled. It supplies
the settlement asset, which transferred among counterparts, provides respective obligations to
be discharged. This asset can take the form of an account balance at the central bank, which
represents a claim on the central bank (settlement in central bank money), or can take the form
of an account balance at a commercial bank, which represents a claim on the commercial bank
(settlement in commercial bank money). The safety of the system depends on the possibility of
the asset issuer’s failure, leading to systemic risk.
The exposure arises when the claim of a participant towards its settlement bank is transformed
into a transferable asset used to discharge an obligation and lasts until the asset is re-
transformed into a claim of the counterpart towards its settlement bank.
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39 On the day previous to the settlement date (t-1), the customers estimate the collateral needed in EUR for the night-time settlement
process (date t) and transmit to CBL a collateral proposal. CBL submits the customers' proposal to BCL which checks whether the
customer's credit balances and a potential intra-day credit cover the request. BCL confirms to CBL the extent to which the requests
are covered by available funds hold at BCL. Upon receipt of confirmation, CBL records the credit line in the customers' CBL account
for the duration of the night-time processing. After the night-time processing CBL calculates for each customer the amount used
during the night for the net settlement of securities and cash transactions and sends a withdrawal of funds request to BCL to pay the
used amounts to its account at BCL. BCL then transfers the amount used from the account of the participant to the account of CBL
and BCL will release the unused amounts of the credit line into the account of the customer.2.1.4.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
Access to central bank money can be desirable under the risk profile. In terms of safety, the
provision of central bank money has the following advantages:
- it reduces settlement risk, because central banks "de facto" do not fail;
- it reduces liquidity constraints on the market, because the settlement asset is liquid; and
- central banks have objectives targeted on the safety of the financial markets and therefore
behave risk-adversely. 
In terms of efficiency, the use of central bank money:
- suffers currently from a lack of economy of scale. The costs for supplying the settlement
account for central banks include the costs of opening and maintaining an account, making
funds transfers and providing credit. Because generally central banks have a limited customer-
base compared to commercial banks, they might be not able to fully realise economies of
scale. A wider use of central bank money could increase the possibility of achieving
economies of scale. On the other hand, increased efficiency can be achieved if the
management of the participants' accounts at the NCB would be outsourced to an SSS. 
- is concentrated at a common settlement institution. The use of commercial bank money on
the other hand would encourage a competition between commercial banks for the provision
of the settlement asset. 
- remote participants do, as a general rule, suffer certain limitations when participating in a
securities settlement system settling in central bank money, such as:
 no access to intra-day liquidity provided by the host national central bank -NCB-;
 cash liquidity held on an account with a host NCB does not count in terms of minimum
reserves and is not remunerated; and
 no access to the deposit facility for the end-of-day liquidity on accounts at the host NCB.
2.1.4.3 Situation in Luxembourg
As of today, CBL does not settle operations in central bank money. The securities leg of ESCB
credit operations is settled via free of payments transactions into the securities pool of the BCL.
No payment leg exists for collateral movement. For non-ESCB transactions, funds transfers
achieve finality under the form of a debit or credit on customers' accounts. When customers
give instructions to deliver or receive securities against funds, each securities transfer is linked
to the specific payment. CBL holds its customer's cash via a network of cash correspondent
banks. 
24The SSS undertakes a selection of its cash correspondents based, among other factors, on the
creditworthiness of the institution. The Internal Credit Group with the support of the Credit
Advisory Group performs the credit analysis of the potential suppliers. Clearstream uses more
than one cash correspondent for funds transfers in euro
40, but as concerns non-euro currencies
accepted for settlement, CBL concentrates the cash service supply on one cash correspondent
for each non-euro currency. 
2.1.5 Operational risk
2.1.5.1 Definition
Due to the fact that clearing and settlement become increasingly dependent on information
systems, the reliability of these arrangements is a key factor which influences operational risk,
together with inadequate control mechanisms, errors and delays in processing or failures to
follow instructions. 
The exposure arises when a transaction order has to be inputted into a system for processing
and lasts until the settlement of the instruction enables the settlement of the respective
counterparts' obligations.
2.1.5.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
All key areas and functions of systems should be secured in terms of access controls, be reliable,
scalable and able to handle crisis and distress. Contingency, backup, recovery and capacity-
stress plans are generally the major mitigation techniques used. In the ideal scenario, all those
facilities should be immediately available and fully operational in case of emergency in order to
recover operations and data processing without interrupting further the settlement process.
Cryptographic techniques are generally used to ensure the reliability of communication
networks and the prompt transmission of data.
2.1.5.3 Situation in Luxembourg
CBL's business continuity plan includes both organisatorial and technical elements. It relies "in
primis" on a corporate business continuity policy which outlines Clearstream's objective to
continue operations in contingency situations and defines further responsibilities in case of
disaster scenarios. It further comprises formal crisis management and emergency response
procedures, business unit, IT
41 and facilities recovery plans. The plan ensures the restart of





40 CBL currently uses ten euro cash correspondents such as: Erste Bank (Austria), KBC Bank (Belgium), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Banco
Bilbao (Spain), Nordea Bank Finland (Finland), Crédit Commercial de France (France), Citibank (Greece), AIB Bank (Irland), IntesaBci
(Italy), Kredietbank (Luxembourg).
41 I Information T Technology.
42 Full business continuity tests and data recovery tests are performed yearly.The contingency mechanisms of Clearstream's Group have proved to be reliable and efficient.
When a terrorist attack made Clearstream's office in New York unavailable on the 11th of
September 2002, Clearstream International core business operations were running as normal
and customer service support was provided to the North American market from CBL's offices in
London, Luxembourg and Mexico City.
2.1.6 Custody risk
2.1.6.1 Definition
Custody risk arises when intermediaries become insolvent, act negligently or commit fraud. The
degree of custody risk is influenced, among other factors, by:
- the accounting practices and safekeeping procedures employed by the custodian; 
- the custodian's choice of the sub-custodians and of other intermediaries;
- the contractual allocation of the risk of securities loss; and 
- the law governing the custodian relationship. 
The exposure arises with the signature of the depository agreement between the depository
bank and the SSS and lasts until one of the parties extinguishes the legal arrangement. 
2.1.6.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
The mitigation mechanisms used by custodians can be based on:
a. insurance and ad hoc internal controls to protect customers against misappropriation and risk
of theft; 
b.segregation between the custodian's own securities and the customer's securities
administered by the depository;
c. regular reconciliation of their records to ensure that the total volume of securities maintained
in the accounts of participants equals the volume of securities deposited by the issuer; 
d. direct relationship between the issuer and the SSS
43.
Furthermore immobilising
44 or dematerialising physical securities may reduce significantly the
cost of owing, trading, custody and settlement of securities and may decrease the occurrence
of errors and delays in manual processing. Major issuances are currently done under the form
of global notes, which represent the whole issue, while all rights and obligations are registered
through book-entry procedures in the respective SSS. This mechanism:
- is a precondition for shortening settlement cycles and therefore reduces replacement cost risk;
- facilitates the implementation of DvP arrangements and therefore reduces principal risk. 
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43 Standard three of the "Standards for the use of EU securities settlement systems in ESCB credit operations" ("no undue custody risk"),
requires SSSs to have a direct and unique relationship with the issuer as to have in place procedures to check that the total amount of
securities in the participants' accounts is equal to the total amount of securities deposited by the issuer in common depositories and
safe-kept on behalf of the SSS.
44 In CSDs.2.1.6.3 Situation in Luxembourg
a. Insurance reduces the cost of mitigation techniques up to the limit of liability of the contract.
Contracts signed off by the parent company CI cover risks arising in CBL as in Clearstream
Banking Frankfurt - CBF -. Major insurances are:
-a   crime and depository indemnity for customer claims for which Clearstream Banking would
be liable according to its General Terms and Conditions
45 (this insurance is aimed at covering
custody and fraud risk); and
- an insurance of all risks of physical loss or damage for losses or damage of instruments held
by Clearstream Banking on behalf of its customers or in transit in Clearstream Banking's
system (this insurance is aimed at covering custody risk).
b. A network of depository banks
46 around the world undertakes the safekeeping of securities
accepted by CBL. CBL allocates each issue to a single depository, which executes customers'
instructions for physical or book-entry transfer of securities into or out of CBL's system. All
depositories have to comply with standards of performance required by CBL. The Internal
Credit Group of CBL performs a risk assessment of potential suppliers of depository services
while an external council provides for a legal opinion on the ability of the depository to fulfil
its obligations under the depository agreement
47 signed with CBL. 
Beside the links towards other SSSs, which have been assessed as eligible for ESCB credit
operations, CBL uses three types of depository banks for national and/or international
securities: common, Euro- and domestic depositories. EOC and CBL jointly appoint common
depositories, whereas Euro- and domestic depositories are appointed by CBL only.
Common depositories are generally used to facilitate the launch of new issues of Eurobonds
48
and international securities. Both CBL and EOC enter into an agreement with the common
depository, according to which the latter acts as an agent for both ICSDs, supplies them
custody services and, on their behalf, receives global notes. Following the night-time
processing, both EOC and CBL notify on a daily basis to common depositories the changes
that have occurred in the volume of the securities represented by a global note. Common
depositories verify the correspondence of the notifications and record the transfer of interests
in the global notes.
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45 CBL is liable for direct damages to its customers, in the event it acts with negligence or willful misconduct (negligence can be defined
as "the violation of a pre-existent obligation", while willful misconduct can be defined as "the non-execution of an essential obligation
defined in a contract") and indirect damages as a result of CBL's depositories, sub-depositories, custodians, sub-custodians acts, etc.,
in the event it acts with gross negligence or willful misconduct (gross negligence can be defined as "the intentional violation of an
obligation").
46 Functions of a depository bank are (i) the safekeeping of securities in its vaults, (ii) the receipt of securities for entry into CBL's system
and confirmation of receipt and (iii) the execution of instructions of CBL and collection of interests and dividends on the holdings. Sub-
depositories are not allowed to sub-deposit the holdings without written approval of CBL.
47 The depository agreement defines the parties, the settlement, depository and safekeeping procedures, insurance coverage and further
bilateral obligations of CBL and the depository.  
48 Bonds issued by a borrower outside the domestic market, denominated in a Eurocurrency, underwritten and sold by an international
syndicate of financial institutions.As concerns Euro depositories, they provide safe custody and other administrative services for
Eurobonds and Euro-instruments in general on the basis of a depository agreement between
the entities, but their services are also accessible to other financial institutions. Domestic
depositories on the other hand are mainly, but not exclusively, used to provide CBL's
customers with a facility to settle cross-border transactions in domestic markets. 
c/d.Common depository banks are appointed by CBL and EOC in order to simplify the
procedures for distributing new issues. The responsibility for the reconciliation procedures
and the safekeeping function for global notes is undertaken by the fiscal agent, which usually
corresponds to the common depository.
2.1.7 Inefficiency risk
2.1.7.1 Definition
Inefficiency risk arises at the time a system does not adequately meet its obligation to its
counterparts (members and suppliers)
49 and when the system is unable to meet customers'
requests without leveraging on prices. It lasts until these conditions are fulfilled.
2.1.7.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
Operators and technical agents need to have in place mechanisms to periodically review:
- the service level supplied;
- the possible improvements that need to be undertaken;
- the pricing strategy; and 
- the operational reliability of the system operated. 
Those considerations have to be implemented in the light of current volumes and values
transacted by the system and of possible future developments. The relative size of the
participants in the system also has some importance for the profitability of the operator due to
the fact that small or medium sized clients do not have a strong negotiating position and might
be charged higher fees compared to the one charged to larger clients. 
Due to the fact that inefficient systems can concentrate risks on a limited group of users and
lead to other type of exposures, unnecessarily restricted access criteria might also be important
in assessing the efficiency level of a system. 
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49 The ability of a system to meet its obligations can be judged according to its financial resources and considering how other systems
meet their obligations.2.1.7.3 Situation in Luxembourg
Admission and termination criteria within CBL are based on the risk profile and creditworthiness
of participants. The latter are furthermore subject to a money laundering review. Access to CBL
is, as general rule, not restricted on the basis of participants' geographical origin but rather on
the assessment of what impact a new participation could have on the system's safety and
efficiency. Hence, the customer base in CBL is broad, highly diversified and internationally
oriented.
Fees charged to customers are split between custody fees, which are charged on the basis of
the account's average daily balance in securities during the month; processing fees, reporting
fees and securities lending and borrowing fees. CBL supplies specialised services for its small
and medium-sized customer base, while EOC, for example, provides standardised services for




Various types of risks may affect cross-border securities transactions (details of the settlement
process are described in first annex). Within a cross-border environment, the settlement
processing might involve the use of different intermediaries, such as local agents, global
custodians or the use of links between CSDs or ICSDs. 
Non-residents normally settle through local agents, which have accounts at the local CSD.
Whether principal risk exists, depends on the fact that the local CSD implements DvP
settlement. 
As a general rule, the settlement can be completed under the condition that the system has
checked if the seller and the buyer have sufficient securities and funds respectively or have
access to securities and fund loans. Determining that both conditions are satisfied in a cross-
border environment, supposes an exchange of information which might last some days in the
worst case. The seller might therefore need to pre-position securities or borrow them some days
before the settlement day. The same can be true for the buyer. 
The custody risk and cash deposit risk incurred by non-resident participants are furthermore
increased by other factors. Usually, CSDs extend intra-day, credit to their participants to enable
them to economise on liquidity holdings. Non-residents firms hold their securities through a
local agent and have to look upon the local agent to receive intra-day cash loans. If this
possibility is not available, a non-resident might need to hold larger cash and securities balances
compared to the balances a direct participant would need to hold to settle the same set of
transactions, and incurs therefore higher opportunity costs. 
29As regards replacement cost risk in a cross-border environment, the risk pattern depends on the
volatility of the security's price and on the time lag between trade and settlement. If the
settlement is undertaken according to the local market settlement practices and timing, the
replacement cost exposure is the same for resident and for non-resident counterparts. 
Global custodians, as opposed to local agents, settle trades and safe-keep securities in many
countries through their network of sub-custodians, which in turn settle through their account
at the local CSD. The sub-custodians have no direct relationship with the customers of the
global custodians and have therefore no knowledge of the interest in securities the customers
held. The custody risk borne by the customer is covered by the contractual relationship between
the global custodian and the sub-custodian.
When cross-border settlement is done through the use of links between CSDs, the number of
intermediaries involved in the transaction chain remains limited. As a consequence, operational,
legal and custody risk is reduced. On the other hand links might increase legal and operational
exposure because the participants in a cross-border transaction operate under different legal
and operational frameworks. The use of links might furthermore increase liquidity constraints
and spill them over to different markets. 
As concerns the settlement through ICSDs, settlement trades with other participants of the
same ICSD
50 does not suffer from principal risk if DvP is implemented. Furthermore ICSDs which
provide for multiple settlement cycles during the day achieve same-day receipt and delivery of
securities. Hence the cash deposit and opportunity risk are limited.
2.1.8.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
In case of cross-border linkages between SSSs or the use of intermediaries such as commercial
intermediaries as sub-custodians, the structure and conditions under which the link is
operational becomes crucial for the mitigation of the risks involved. Due to the fact that it is
the SSS which usually concludes the agreement with third parties/intermediaries, importance is
achieved by the functions the intermediary performs, its risk management procedures, under
which conditions the SSS advances funds or securities on behalf of third parties and which are
the standards used to select intermediaries by the SSS. 
The cross-border costs and risks are heavily influenced by the practices in the local markets in
which intermediaries are located and have their activities. In case of bridges, i.e. links between
ICSDs, cash deposit and liquidity risk can be mitigated by the introduction of multiple
settlement cycles. Bridges can further involve other risks as result of their processing especially
if considering automated bridges operating a series of night-time settlement runs. The
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50 Settlement trades with other participants of the same ICSD are named "internal settlement trades" because they are effected on the
ICSD's own books without any intervention of intermediaries. following describes the major risks which could arise and the corresponding risk mitigation
which could be implemented during a bridge processing, such as:
- principal risk; if during the bridge processing transfer instructions are settled against credit on
customer's accounts, the bridge might be defined as delivery-versus-credit - DvC - settlement
process. DvC reduces principal risk;
- replacement cost and liquidity risk; if the time-lag between the proposal of securities
deliveries and its acceptance by the counterpart ICSD is limited to the same overnight cycle,
this can reduce replacement cost and liquidity risk in case of delays in settlement or failed
transactions;
- credit risk; if both ICSDs credit their participants' accounts before knowing that the final
delivery to and the corresponding final payment from the corresponding ICSD has taken
place, once finality is achieved, the resulting credit exposure could be covered by a letter of
credit, which each system can receive for example from a syndicate of banks. An initial credit
exposure might furthermore arise in case an ICSD sends settlement instructions first and/or
when proposals for the delivery of securities have to be maximised.
- risk of fraud or loss of the deposited securities; those exposures could be covered more or less
extensively within the insurance framework of both ICSDs respectively for the amount
specified in the insurance contract.
- opportunity costs; if participants are able to receive settlement reports early in the morning
or even during the night from the ICSDs, participants' cash management possibilities could be
improved;
- liquidity risk; if lending facilities are available during each settlement run and participants are
exempted from charges for securities borrowed in one settlement run if these are reimbursed
in a following run during the same night-time processing, liquidity risk could be reduced;
- operational risk; if systems provide the possibility of automatically recycling unsettled bridge
transactions so that participants do not have to manually re-enter them for settlement on the
following day, operational risk could be reduced.
Further exposures might arise, such as;
- backlog exposure;
The backlog exposure might arise when unsettled transactions at the end of the night-time
processing are settled during the following night-time cycle. 
- net-end cash exposure; 
At the end of the settlement process, a net cash exposure results. This exposure can be
covered for example by a letter of credit in favour of each ICSD respectively. If the amount of
the letter of credit were based on a peak intra-day exposure, the inter-system exposure would
be totally covered, but the ICSDs would have to bear high costs in order to negotiate for a
high letter of credit. On the other hand, if the amount of the letter of credit were to be based
on the peak end-of-day exposure, the inter-system exposure might not be totally covered, but
the ICSDs would bear less costs to negotiate for a lower letter of credit. In the latter case, in
order to avoid risk-spreading, the amount in excess of the letter of credit resulting at the end
of the settlement process, could be covered by a loss-sharing agreement by which, in case of
the default of an ICSD in paying the net cash position in excess, its participants would pay.
312.1.8.3 Situation in Luxembourg
CBL makes use of direct
51 or indirect links via intermediaries on local markets in which it has
activities. To enable an efficient settlement and to provide tailor-made services for its diversified
customers' base, CBL has put in place arrangements with a network of global custodians and
sub-custodians which have in turn direct access to local clearing and settlement services.
Depending on the characteristics of the local market infrastructure
52, those intermediaries might
provide their customers, besides custody services, with fiscal or cash settlement services. In case
custodians do not have the possibility of settling cash positions nor that of granting intra-day
credit to participants, customers will have to look to cash correspondents to settle the cash leg
of their securities transactions. 
With reference to the bridge arrangement between CBL and EOC, finality of bridge transactions
occurs when the ICSDs accepts the securities deliveries proposed by the counterpart SSS. Until
that moment in time the cash and securities credits and debits remain provisional (see second
annex for details concerning bridge processing). 
The end net cash exposure which results from the book-entry settlement of bilateral positions
on CBL's and EOC's accounts during the bridge, is covered by a letter of credit. Only the SSSs'
exposure in excess of the amount guaranteed by the letter of credit, if any, remains an exposure
on the other respective SSS.
At the end of the process, unsettled transactions will be settled during the following night-time
cycle (backlog transactions
53). The customer's collateral value of the securities debited is
maintained until confirmation of the acceptance/refusal of the transaction is received in the
following night-time processing. In this context, the extension of the bridge processing is a first
step to the fully automated day-time bridge between CBL and EOC. CBL's customers benefit
from this extension due to the fact that they are able to settle backlog transactions resulting
from the previous night-time processing, while EOC's participants benefit from the fact that
they will be able to propose deliveries to CBL's customers if they have received additional




51 Direct links involve the maintenance of a account on the name of CBL at the local CSD. CBL has direct links with SSSs in Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom.
52 Such as operating hours, different cut-off times, etc.. 
53 A backlog transaction is a free or against payment transaction for delivery to a bridge counterpart where provision to execute the
delivery becomes available on the deliverer's account in CBL, through a purchase or free receipt for the first time, at the end of the
night-time processing. In order to respect the settlement sequence given by the customer, the provision is debited from the account,
but, as EOC does not accept any additional delivery for the same night-time processing, the transaction is held in the backlog for day-
time bridge settlement or the next night-time bridge processing. (CBL's customer handbook, p. 3-15).2 2. .2 2   P Pa ay ym me en nt t   s sy ys st te em ms s   - -   P PS S   - -
The approach implemented when analysing securities settlement systems has been consistently
used for payment systems. The risks, which are common to both systems, have not been further
defined or described in this section, but reference has been made to the analysis carried out in
the context of securities settlement systems.
2.2.1 Legal risk
2.2.1.1 Definition and possible risk mitigation techniques
The definition of the exposure and the possible mitigation mechanisms correspond to the ones
provided in this context for SSSs. 
2.2.1.2 Situation in Luxembourg
The systems LIPS-Net and LIPS-Gross and its participants are all companies incorporated under
Luxembourg law. The following legal framework refers to both systems.
Finality
Within LIPS-Gross irrevocability
54 is achieved when the current account of the sending
participant held at the BCL is debited. Payments become final for the sending participant when
his account held at the BCL is debited (funds have been blocked on the account) and for the
receiving participant when his current account at the BCL is credited. The blocking of funds in
LIPS-Gross during the netting process in LIPS-Net is irrevocable when settlement has taken place
in LIPS-Gross. 
In LIPS-Net a transaction becomes irrevocable when the order is transmitted to the central
application at Cetrel and becomes final when the current accounts of the participants at BCL
with multilateral net debit/credit positions are debited/credited.
Dispute resolution
The respective rights and obligations of counterparts are set out in the rules of the system. In
case of dispute, each participant has the right to request the opening of a conciliation
procedure in order to find a solution concerning the dispute, its impact and damages. 
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54 According to the transposition of the Settlement Finality Directive into Luxembourg law, the point of irrevocability corresponds to the
point of entry into the system.2.2.2 Credit risk
2.2.2.1 Definition
Credit exposure between participants in a payment system arise when there is a delay between
the processing of an instruction for settlement and the final settlement of the payment and
lasts until finality has been achieved.
Some deferred net systems
55 provide for the possibility of unwinding a transaction in the event
of a participant's failure and might create therefore an incentive for counterparts not to
manage credit risk adequately. On the other hand, if the recalculation of the net position results
in a different exposure compared to the original one, participants might be left with inadequate
funds to meet other obligations in due time.
2.2.2.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
Tools to manage credit risk involve the use of:
- real-time gross settlement systems;
- limits on the credit exposures the counterparts can take in the system based on participants'
creditworthiness. Those limits can be set either according to the multilateral net exposures a
single counterpart has to all other participants or according to the bilateral net exposure
between the two counterparts in a transaction;
- loss-sharing arrangements. If the value of participants' contribution in the collateral pool
might be different from the loss they would borne in case a transaction fails to be settled,
participants might have an incentive to default on loss-sharing obligations and to shift the
cost to post collateral on other participants;
- full collateralisation of exposures.
2.2.2.3 Situation in Luxembourg 
Credit risk in LIPS-Gross is mitigated through:
- the use of real-time settlement with immediate finality;
- the need for counterparts to have sufficient funds available or a fully collateralised credit line
to enable the settlement;
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55 The distinction between real-time gross settlement systems and deferred net systems relates to the form and timing of the settlement
and not to the way payments are processed. Deferred net systems can handle payments in real-time, they nevertheless settle in batches
of net positions at designated times, either during the business day either at the end of the day. RTGS systems settle transactions one
by one as soon as sufficient available funds are present. Concerning deferred net systems, participants are exposed to credit risk from
the acceptance of the payment instruction into the netting system for settlement to the moment the net positions are booked and
finality is achieved. RTGS systems do not involve credit risk, but liquidity risk for those payments not accepted for settlement. Hybrid
systems (e.g. LIPS-Net) combine finality of settlement in real-time gross settlement systems with an efficient use of liquidity. Their main
characteristic is frequent netting of payments during the day or at intervals to the extent that the resulting debit positions are fully
covered. Payments that cannot be settled are kept for the next settlement cycle.- the application of collateral management criteria. As general rule, the value of the collateral
provided to cover a transaction diminished by a valuation haircut, has to be in value
constantly superior or equivalent to the total value of the operations for which the collateral
has been provided for, augmented by an initial margin as buffer measure. The Eurosystem
applies different valuation haircuts according to the different characteristics of the collateral
supplied. The mark-to-marketing mechanism (variation margin) enables the central bank to
call for additional collateral (margin call) if the market value of the collateral pledged to the
NCB becomes inferior to a predetermined limit. Where the collateral value exceeds the
amount needed by the customer to cover the transaction, increased by the initial margin, the
central bank will return the collateral in excess;
- the respect of the criteria specified by the ECB
56 for eligible collateral.
As concerns LIPS-Net, the system settles its positions in LIPS-Gross in central bank money and
it is protected by the same mitigation techniques implemented for the gross system. It does not
enable transactions to be unwound and does not provide for a loss-sharing arrangement in case
a participant defaults. The need to implement those arrangements seems nevertheless to be
limited, due to the fact that the system currently processes payments of low value and the
resulting net positions are limited in value.
2.2.3 Liquidity risk
2.2.3.1 Definition
Liquidity risk arises in different ways in a deferred net settlement system and in a real-time gross
settlement system. In RTGS systems, liquidity needs to be available on accounts of counterparts
to allow payments to be accepted for settlement. Insufficient liquidity can result in a gridlock.
A similar situation can occur in deferred net settlement systems in case credit limits prevent
large payments from being settled. A queuing mechanism which is based on the principles that
the first instruction inputted into the system is also the first instruction settled (FIFO), might
create additional delays for large payments. 
2.2.3.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
The central bank can provide liquidity to participants in a number of ways:
a. making a loan by crediting the funds on the participant's settlement account;
b. granting a lending facility in the form of an overdraft on the participant's settlement account;
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56 Eligible assets for ESCB monetary policy operations and for securing intra-day credit are listed in the Tier One and the Tier Two lists
published by the ECB. The Tier One list consists of marketable assets which fulfil the following criteria:
- are listed or quoted on  regulated market or non-regulated markets as specified by the ECB;
- are denominated in euro;
- are issued by entities located in the European Economic Area;
- are transferable in book-entry form;
- are deposited with an NCB or with a Central Securities Depository.
The Tier Two list consists of additional assets which the NCBs consider of particular importance for their national financial markets and
banking system. They can be marketable or non-marketable financial obligations or equities on a regulated market. Normally they have
to be denominated in euro, located in the euro area and issued or guaranteed by entities located in the euro area. Luxembourg does
not have a Tier Two list. c. entering into a sale and repurchase arrangement (repo) with the participant. In the sale leg
of the operation, the funds are credited to the participant's settlement account and the title
of the securities transferred to the central bank. In the repurchase leg, the funds are credited
to the central bank and the title of the securities transferred back to the participant. 
Gridlock resolution, queuing and monitoring mechanisms permit the reduction of liquidity
constraints of counterparts within the system. Net deferred settlement systems might provide
for special protection in case of liquidity tensions stemming from the inability to settle of the
participant with the largest individual settlement obligation by the use of a collateral pool
combined with committed lines of credit. 
2.2.3.3 Situation in Luxembourg
BCL, as settlement agent of LIPS-Gross and LIPS-Net, provides fully collateralised intra-day credit
facilities to participants. Both systems implement FIFO as queuing mechanism. The participating
banks themselves are responsible for setting priorities to the payments they whish to settle first
according to the funds they have available on their accounts with the goal of avoiding
unnecessarily long queues.
Queuing facility
Within LIPS-Gross, instructions are queued per settlement account if the liquidity available for
settlement is insufficient (e.g. because the participant has breached the limit) and are
reconsidered for settlement every time:
- sufficient funds are received under the form of a credit posted to the participant's account or
additional collateral is made available;
- the payment at the head of the queue is cancelled or given a lower business priority;
- a new or existing payment for a lower value is given a higher priority than the one at the top
of the queue;
- gridlock processing resolves the situation.
Gridlock facility
Gridlock occurs when two or more payment queues are blocked due to shortage of funds on a
participant's account. The resolution algorithm in LIPS-Gross can be initiated by default or
periodically by the settlement agent, provided that there is more than one queue blocked. The
mechanism chooses a set of payments in consecutive order of arrival within payment priority
starting from the head of each queue, which will be settled as a single unit. Each attempt to
settle the payments selected either succeeds or fails for the whole unit. In case of failure, the
algorithm finds otherwise the maximum number of payments which debit the account, by
respecting the payment queue order, which could settle with the estimated available funds and
selects those for the second reiteration and the process is repeated. The algorithm works under
the optimistic assumption that all credits due to the account on which the iteration has been
initiated will be honoured. The audit records of the settled payments will carry the same
timestamp. 
36A selection algorithm is present also in LIPS-Net, within Cetrel's system. For each participant
which is lacking funds in LIPS-Gross, the algorithm selects the last batches which exceed the
amount available and postpones them to the next clearing cycle. 
Monitoring facility
A monitoring facility within LIPS-Gross enables counterparts to identify and resolve liquidity
constraints; particularly those relating to queues of payments and gridlock. The central bank
workstation displays critical information continuously, but not in real-time, while non-critical
information is available under the form of inquiries. Information which can be consulted
continuously for each account relates to the:
- available funds and balance;
- account limit;
- queue blockages;
- whether the account is participating in a gridlock resolution;
- queue summary information (total credits queued, total debits queued).
Each participant is responsible for monitoring the settlement of the payments sent, the number
and the amount of payments stored in waiting queues and the balance of its current accounts. 
LIPS-Net participants on the other hand recieve information on their net positions via LIPS-Gross
monitoring facility when funds have been blocked on their accounts. 
Rules of good conduct and obligations
Within LIPS-Gross, bilateral obligations of participants and BCL are set out in the relevant rules, while
within LIPS-Net, participants have to respect the rules of good conduct established by the operator.
Those rules of good conduct set obligations on participants, which, inter alia, require customers to
have sufficient credit available on their accounts not to impede the settlement of net positions; they
furthermore require participants not to reduce their multilateral net position through dummy
operations. In the event of violations, SYPAL-Gie can impose sanctions on participants.
2.2.4 Risk of settlement bank failure 
2.2.4.1 Definition and possible risk mitigation techniques
The definition of the exposure corresponds to the ones provided in this context for SSSs. 
The risk of settlement bank failure has to be seen in the context of two major factors. The first
factor refers to the creditworthiness of the issuer of the settlement asset. The second factor
relates to the capability of transferring the settlement asset into other liquid claims. The time-
frame during which participants use the settlement asset to discharge their obligations,
represents the duration of participants' involuntary exposure towards their settlement
institution. 
37As a general rule, to mitigate the risk of settlement bank failure, use is either made of central
bank money (please refer to section 2.1.4.2 for details) or the duration of the participant's
voluntary exposure is reduced (e.g. through the use of real-time settlement). 
2.2.4.2 Situation in Luxembourg
The real-time gross system and the net system both settle in central bank money. 
2.2.5 Operational risk 
2.2.5.1 Definition and possible risk mitigation techniques
The definition of the exposure corresponds to the one provided in this context for SSSs.
As for SSSs, contingency measures are the major mitigation techniques used. These mechanisms
are generally kept as simple and practical as possible due to the fact that they have to work
under stress conditions and the personnel is less familiar with them. For a real-time gross
settlement system, the secondary site could be maintained in a hot standby mode with a
continuous transfer of data from the primary to the secondary site. For end-of-day settlement
systems, the resumption time can also be defined more broadly, i.e. in terms of hours rather
than minutes. The location of the secondary site may vary depending on the type of threats and
can also include different levels of services for different contingencies.
2.2.5.2 Situation in Luxembourg
LIPS-Gross has to meet the security and operational reliability standards as outlined by the
TARGET Security Requirements, which include organisational and technical requirements on the
physical access to RTGS locations, back-up and recovery procedures. Furthermore LIPS-Gross is
subject to periodic risk analyses undertaken at EU and national level. 
Different types of tests are carried out on a regular basis, ranging from:
- internal BCL testing;
- bilateral tests with the ECB;
- group tests with other NCBs.
In case of contingency, participants can transmit instructions by fax. Due to the fact that this
procedure is done manually, it does not permit the processing of the high volumes of payments
which are normally processed automatically. Some payments need therefore to be prioritised
and settled first. 
The technical agent Cetrel mitigates mostly operational risk within LIPS-Net. Besides Cetrel's
internal audit controls on system's operability and reliability, the operator, SYPAL-Gie,
commissions every year a technical audit on the system's functioning.
38Contingency procedures for LIPS-Gross (TARGET)
In case one component of TARGET would remain unavailable for a longer time period, one or
several NCBs will become service providers for the failed national RTGS and channel the
payments from and to the failed component. Furthermore, in case of need, a delayed closing
time procedure can be activated through which NCBs allow new critical payments to be
received and debited after the TARGET 18:00 closing time. Under the legal provisions of the
ECB, the recovery time of the secondary site is set at four hours.  
Back-up procedures for LIPS-Net
LIPS-Net back-up procedures enable data exchange in the event of a telecommunication
network failure in order to achieve manual settlement of at least one netting cycle per day. Each
participant prepares a file with all the information needed to validate the transactions to be
settled and forwards them to the settlement agent, BCL, which will calculate the net
multilateral positions. The settlement agent has furthermore to verify manually the limits of the
participants and subsequently proceeds to the settlement in LIPS-Gross. In case the limits are
breached, the participant is required to cover the part exceeding the limit. At the end of the
settlement, the two counterparts in the transaction exchange the files containing the
settlement information. 
Place an organisation in default
In emergency situations the central bank may need to prevent further processing of payments
to or from any of the accounts belonging to a particular participant organisation. The
management of BCL can place the organisation in default and, by doing so, the system LIPS-
Gross will reject all payments to or from the account(s) owned by the defaulting member. 
In case of participant's failure within LIPS-Net, the member's instructions are excluded from
every settlement cycle from the moment the settlement agent has acknowledged the member's
failure. The system rejects all instructions presented after that time-limit and returns to the
sender all operations which have been already validated but no yet settled. On the other hand




Efficiency of a system can be referred to as a measure for its cost-effectiveness (e.g. in terms of
cost per payment charged to customers) or for its productivity (e.g. in terms of number of
payments that the system is able to process).
Procedures and mitigation techniques generally cover settlement risk and do not directly
address inefficiency risk by itself, because every abnormal situation might have an impact on
39efficiency. Several symptoms of inefficiency can be seen in the inability of the system to cope
with the level of demand, in long processing hours, in persistently excess capacity, in relatively
high customers' fees compared to alternative payment systems, etc.. 
2.2.6.2 Possible risk mitigation techniques
The major costs involved in processing a payment are usually:
- the costs borne by the central processing system;
- the operating costs borne by the participants; and 
- the opportunity costs for participants to hold liquidity to fund payment obligations. 
The totality of costs is generally reflected in fees charged to the customers. Pricing policies can
create competitive pressure between systems and give an incentive to participants to migrate
from a service supplier to a less costly but less reliable one. This incentive depends on the
available alternatives on the market. Central banks, as system's operators for example, could
easily choose to subsidise part of the cost of a payment processing in order to incentivate the
development of financial markets or to encourage customers to choose more reliable systems.
Subsidies can be justified generally on the ground of the need to correct market externalities
but incur nevertheless in the risk of sending misleading price signals. Furthermore they may be
difficult to be levied. 
Operators can apply different pricing methodologies depending on the participants' volume of
payments or on the time at which instructions are inputted into the system. According to the
"cost recovery methodology" for example, the fees cover operator's fixed and variable costs
and are based on an estimation of the volumes to be processed by each member. According to
the "market based methodology", the fees cover all costs and a surplus which is based on
forecasts on future market developments. 
Beside the pricing policy, the participation criteria influence efficiency. Different levels of
participation, such as direct or indirect membership, also give rise eventually to operational and
credit risk. 
2.2.6.3 Situation in Luxembourg
At the time LIPS-Gross was first implemented, costs were divided between BCL and the at the
time existing participants. New participants need currently to pay a fixed transaction fee, an
entrance fee and an annual fee
57, which varies depending on the usage of the system. The
account holder also bears the cost of interfaces, communication services and security
arrangements. The pricing policy is based on a full-cost recovery principle. The system has a
limited customer base.  
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57 The domestic transaction fee is currently € 0.8 and cross-border fees per transaction vary from € 1.75 to € 0.8 depending on the
volumes processed, the entrance fee is currently around € 125 000 and the annual fee is between € 12 000 and € 42 000.Prerequisites for participation include the maintenance of an account with the BCL, operational
capacity and solvency
58. Access is granted to Luxembourg-based institutions or enterprises
which are authorised to exercise activities in Luxembourg and subject to prudential supervision
in the country. 
Within LIPS-Net, the costs of the operator are recovered according to their nature:
- variable costs are recovered through entrance, annual and transaction fees
59;
- investment costs are recovered through contributions on the basis of members' processing
volumes. 
The operator approves the investments to be undertaken, which are recovered at the end of the




58 The institutions listed in the rules of the system are entitled to be member. In terms of operational capability they need to have access
to SWIFT, have a Bank Identifier Code, be a member of the RTGS-Gie user group set up by SWIFT, make use of the participant
workstation, etc.. In terms of financial soundness, each participant is deemed to be financially sound if listed on the official list
published by the competent supervisory authority. Furthermore in terms of legal soundness, the BCL can ask for legal opinion on
participants' capability to comply with access criteria. 
59 The entrance fee varies between € 50 000 and € 250 000, the annual fee varies between € 2 500 and € 12 500 and transaction fees
vary between € 0.160 and € 0.230.3 Oversight responsibility and risk mitigation
Overseers are responsible, among other tasks, for contributing to the efficiency and stability of
payment and securities settlement systems. One of their ultimate goals is to reduce systemic
risk. The potential for a system to transmit disruptions, does significantly depend, among other
factors, on the type of system (payment or securities settlement), the value of the transactions
it processes, the resources of the participants in aggregate and in individual form and the
nature of the transactions processed. On the other hand, the tools which overseers might
implement to evaluate how institutions mitigate risks, are not necessarily dependent on the
type of system they oversee. Hence, the same oversight approach and tools can be
implemented for securities settlement as for payment systems (the third annex provides a
practical example of how to assess an exposure and its respective risk mitigation techniques
according to the methodology described in this chapter). 
The evaluation of exposures and of the availability and appropriateness of risk mitigation
techniques is an exercise which might need to be undertaken continuously. Each
malfunctioning or external threat has the potential to increase the probability that a risk
materialises. Overseers can focus their evaluation on the system's ownership, its operators' and
technical agents' risk management function and risk policies. A risk assessment can involve:
- the evaluation of internal procedures and policies;
- the evaluation of statistical reporting (e.g. volumes and values, etc.) and the forecast of future
trends;
- the assessment of external threats to the system;
- the evaluation of risk mitigation techniques and of the follow-up on incidents;
- the review of the systems' functioning;
- the review of contingency procedures and testing plans; and
- the evaluation of action plans to achieve full operational reliability within a reasonable time-
scale.
3 3. .1 1   R Ri is sk k   m mi it ti ig ga at ti io on n   a an nd d   o ov ve er rs si ig gh ht t
As concerns risk mitigation, the aim of oversight can be defined as follows:
- to develop (an) objective(s) in terms of safety of the overseen systems;
- to systematically identify and analyse potential risk-based scenarios and compare them to the
objective(s) defined; 
- to develop tools to dynamically assess the availability and appropriateness of risk mitigation
techniques in use by overseen systems; and
- to develop recommendations to further contribute to the reduction of systemic risk in the
light of past and future developments.
This chapter defines guidelines intended to assist the evaluation and the assessment of risk
mitigation techniques, risk policies and their implementation in the context of payment and
securities settlement systems. Those guidelines have been shaped as comprehensively as
possible so that they can be easily adapted when that is considered necessary. 
42Supervisory tools can be defined according to three major types and principles:
- Research tools;
Research tools should enable overseers to gain an understanding of the existing exposures in
the context of payment and securities settlement systems and to foresee possible future
exposures which might arise as result of systems' developments or of new external threats.
This might be achieved on one hand through the use of risk evaluation tools (the goal is to
research exposures) or through the use of scenarios (the goal is to define under which
conditions risks can arise and better be mitigated);
- Assessment tools; 
Assessment tools should enable the evaluation of the availability and appropriateness of risk
mitigation techniques implemented by operators and technical agents; and
- Intervention tools and/or procedures;
Intervention tools and/or procedures should enable overseers to react promptly in case of
contingency and to contribute, when possible, in reducing the impact, caused by a
transaction failure, on the different counterparts.
The use of different supervisory tools is interconnected. Research tools permit the systematic
gaining of a wide understanding of the threats arising from the financial market and the
achievement of a knowledge of the system’s vulnerabilities. The result of the research permits
the dynamic identification of the roots of exposures, to assess in turn if the risk mitigation
techniques adopted by overseen systems might be adequate and if current mitigation
mechanisms could cover new threats in the process of development. This evaluation permits the
optimal shaping of procedures and the intervention mechanism to be used by overseers in case
of crisis and contingency. 
Different supervisory tools have different fields of application and can be implemented as
follows:
- continuously or ad-hoc;
- a priori (when a risk exists but has not yet materialised in a transaction failure) or a posteriori
(when a risk has materialised in a transaction failure). 
Research tools can be implemented in both ways. On one hand they can be used a priori and
continuously with the goal of analysing the roots of exposures, to evaluate their nature, map
them, estimate their future developments on the basis of historical data and to define which
corrective actions can be implemented to reduce them. On the other hand they can be used a
posteriori and ad hoc once a new exposure arises.
Assessment tools focus on the analysis of risk mitigation mechanisms in use by overseen
institutions and can be implemented continuously and a priori. Their goal is to ensure that risk
mitigation techniques:
43- are adequately shaped to cover all major exposures which currently exist;
- realistically limit the probability of risks' materialisation without leveraging excessively on the
costs the system's operators or technical agents have to bear;
- cover, when possible, the damages created by the materialisation of a risk. 
Intervention tools on the other hand, can be implemented a posteriori and ad hoc in order to
ensure a timely reaction of overseers in case of contingency. 
3.1.1 Research tools
Research tools can be various in structure and in nature. Their major goal is to permit overseers
to gain, among other factors, an understanding of which risks exist or might arise in payment
and securities settlement systems and how they might arise, to evaluate their frequency and
their possibility of materialisation. This methodology could be used for both, known as
unknown risks; however the identification and the evaluation of unknown exposures might
create particular challenges. 
Research tools might be quantitative or qualitative in nature. Quantitative tools are generally
based on the collection and the analysis of historical data; a methodology which enables
overseers to evaluate the major pattern of exposures which have arisen in the past and to
foresee what might be their future development possibilities. Qualitative tools, on the other
hand, are based on non-quantifiable criteria (they might include, for example, the identification
of the respective obligations and roles of counterparts involved in a transaction). Indeed,
overseers need to maintain a balance between the use of the two categories of tools in order
to express an assessment which is not biased in its scope. 
Research tools need to summarise in a simplified structure (scenario) a multitude of variables,
which might be difficult to group due to their different nature. When adopting this approach,
one of the major issues consists in identifying under which scenario which exposure might arise,
grade different scenarios in terms of probability of occurrence and rate the largest credible loss
for each of the scenarios defined. This procedure can have the advantage of beeing able to:
- model reality by selecting the most important variables (internal and external to the system)
which might have a critical impact on payment or securities settlement;
- provide overseers with the opportunity to foresee future developments by adding new
variables in existing scenarios; and
- enable overseers to structure and define scenarios in such a way that they might be easily
adjusted once they become obsolete. 
The disadvantage of the approach is, on the other hand, that scenarios can only represent
reality in a quite reductive form. The following sections give an overview of the different
research tools which might be implemented by overseers. 
443.1.1.1 Identification of risks
Unless a risk has been recognised it might not be adequately managed and mitigated. The
identification of exposures has therefore the goal of highlighting which risks have occurred in
the past, under which circumstances and which causes might be at the basis of such exposures.
Identifying risks can be done through different means. 
A first means can be through by the analysis of the standard life-cycle of a payment or securities
settlement transaction (see the first annex for details concerning payment and securities
settlement processing). This exercise can highlight, under normal circumstances, which can be
the different stages of the settlement process and which are the different statuses that the
transaction order achieves throughout the processing chain. The goal is to define:
- the exact moment at which the exposure arises and until when it lasts (within the description
of the risks and risk mitigation techniques in chapter I, the text provides a short definition of
the moment in time at which each exposure arises and until when it lasts); and
- the nature of the obligations of counterparts’, operators’ and technical agents’ part in the
transaction, with the goal of investigating what might be the causes of the exposure.
A second means of identifying risks relies on the analysis of the system's internal rules and
procedures. This exercise enables overseers to gain an understanding of the system's design and
to define precisely the roles and obligations of counterparts and operators in the different
situations; e.g. which parties have to be notified under normal or exceptional circumstances,
the timing of decision-making processes, the responsible entities or individuals for taking
decisions in emergency situations, etc.. This information should highlight (besides the bilateral
and multilateral obligations each party in the transaction has) what can be the degree of
discretion different entities are able to exercise in taking decisions and what might be the
impact on the functioning of the system. For example, the identification of the notification and
escalation procedures provides an understanding of who bears ultimately the risk and to which
extent the responsible person or entity bears this risk in case of contingency. Hence, the basis
of the evaluation can be the understanding of which situations might not be foreseen or
adequately covered by the internal rules, procedures or manual of instructions. 
A third means involves the use of scenarios. This exercise is difficult to be laid down in a formal
procedure; nevertheless the following issues are of importance in this context, such as:
a. the definition of the different exposures to be analysed;
b. the definition of internal and external variables (in scenario building, external and internal
conditions have to be specified and simplified as much as possible. Nevertheless, the more
conditions are taken into account, the more the scenarios will be a valuable approximation
of reality);
c. the definition of a probability of occurrence for each scenario (this might give an appreciation
of the importance of the results obtained);
d. the determination of objectives in terms of a system's safety;
e. the adoption of a risk-adverse approach when analysing the results of the simulations;
45f. the analysis of real events to periodically review the scenarios and the simulation results
60. 
One of the crucial issues might be to define what are the objectives in terms of a system's safety
(point d.). Hence two types of objectives can be used: 
- the "clean objective". It determines if and to which extent the system might theoretically bear
certain risks under normal circumstances of operation
61.
- the "acceptance objective". It defines to what extent overseers consider certain risks
acceptable from the oversight perspective in the light of the clean threshold. The philosophy
behind the "acceptance objective" expresses the need to reduce exposures without
necessarily eliminating them; it means furthermore checking that operators and technical
agents are aware of risks and that their mitigation techniques can transform an unacceptable
risk into an acceptable one.
The "acceptance objective" can differ from the clean one, but can also be similar to it. The
operator and/or technical agent might be in a position to define the "clean objective" (in the
light of simulations or statistical data analysis), while overseers might co-operate with the
operator and/or technical agent in the definition of the "acceptance objective". The two types
of objectives might need to be revised periodically as a result of new developments; internal or
external to the systems.
3.1.1.2 Analysis of risks
So as to be able to categorise risks, exposures can be analysed according to three major
characteristics:
- the  scale of the risk, which gives an understanding of the severity of the exposure and
therefore also of its potential impact on the system's functioning in case it materialises;
- the duration of the exposure; and 
- the frequency at which the risk arises and at which it materialises.
Measuring the scale of exposures
The scale of a risk represents the proportional size of an exposure and is usually linked to its
duration: the longer the duration, the more its scale will be significant. 
Measuring the scale of risks can be done by evaluing the impact of a transaction failure on the
system's functioning and on the participants involved in the transaction
62. The proxy can include
for example financial losses incurred by the non-defaulting counterpart when replacing the
contract at market prices, the costs of claims presented by the clients for the non-execution of
the transaction, reputation loss costs, etc..
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60 The accident of 11 of September 2001 showed how the risks of terrorist attacks have been usually underestimated by systems as by
insurance companies. As effect, crisis management has increased in importance after the accident.
61 E.g.: Which is the maximum load of transactions that the system can process under normal circumstances?
62 Through the use of historical data if available, such as industry pooled data. Market surveys on the other hand represent an instrument which gives an appreciation of the
duration of exposures and therefore of its scale. The objective is to identify best and sound
practice on the market and where changes in local or international procedures can be necessary
and practicable. The results highlight which perception market participants have of systems' risk
management and the reliability of its internal controls. It furthermore enables overseers to
evaluate the potential impact of a change in market practices. A change in the cut-off times or
a change in the definition of the point of entry for settling instructions into a system, for
example, can higher or lower the duration of participants' credit exposures to counterparts and
therefore the scale of the risk. 
Measuring the duration of exposures
The duration of an exposure identifies the moment in time at which the exposure materialises
and the point in time at which is extinguishes. The operator and/or technical agent might be
interested to investigate how long on average, at a minimum or at a maximum, each type of
exposure lasts. 
As concerns credit risks for example, two points in time can be relevant in identifying the
exposure's duration; the unilateral payment cancellation deadline (irrevocability point) and the
receipt-identification time. The cancellation deadline is defined as the last moment in time
when a counterpart could unilaterally amend, delay or cancel its payment instruction. The
receipt-identification time can be defined as the moment in time when the counterpart checks
the information about the finality of the funds or securities received. The participant's actual
exposure in a payment or securities settlement system lasts from the time the instruction can
no longer be cancelled unilaterally until the time the payment (funds or securities) is received
as final. The period of irrevocability may be followed by an uncertain period, which ranges from
the moment in time after which the payment is due until the moment when the counterpart
identifies whether or not it has received the transfer. 
This kind of analysis facilitates the recognition, throughout the settlement process, when
counterparts bilaterally discharge their obligations, so as not to under- or overestimate
exposures' duration. Credit risk can be reduced, for example, by extending participants'
cancellation deadlines and by bringing forward the receipt-identification time. Hence, the
duration of the exposure could be reduced.
As regards systemic risk, measuring its duration, entails particular difficulties. This type of
exposure might arise as result of transaction's failures, but may not have an idiosyncratic





63 The contagion effect defines the impact a transaction failure has on counterparts which were not part in the original transaction.Measuring the frequency at which exposures arise and at which they materialise
The frequency at which an exposure arises can be defined as the average between:
- the frequency at which the exposure has arisen in the past; and
- an estimation of the frequency at which it could possibly arise in future. 
In the same way, the frequency at which a risk materialises can be given by the average
between:
- the frequency at which the exposure has materialised in the past; and 
- an estimation of the frequency at which it could possibly materialise in future.
With regard to credit risk for example, as concerns the frequency at which the exposure arises,
every time two counterparts enter into a deal, a credit exposure arises. Hence the frequency at
which credit risk arises seems to be very high. 
As concerns the frequency at which the exposure materialises, the analysis of the
creditworthiness of customers might show that the less creditworthy counterparts might be the
ones which default more often on their obligations. A second reason might be of operational
nature, i.e. in case instructions for payment or delivery of securities are wrongly formatted, this
causes in turn delays in the execution of transaction orders. 
It might be possible to design a template with a list of those counterparts which defaulted in
the past, sub-dividing them according to the reason of default, indicating for which transaction
values they have been defaulting on average and their respective frequency of default.
According to this information it should be possible to calculate a moving average of their
default frequency and foresee a future trend. The same approach can be applied consistently to
other types of risks.
TEMPLATE 1: ANALYSIS OF RISKS
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T TY YP PE E      O OF F      R RI IS SK K: :            C CR RE ED DI IT T      R RI IS SK K
Counterpart Creditworthiness of Absolute value Relative value Reason Transaction 
the counterpart of default  of default of default value of default
…. … …. ….
T TY YP PE E      O OF F      R RI IS SK K: :            L LI IQ QU UI ID DI IT TY Y      R RI IS SK K
Counterpart ….
…. … …. ….
T TY YP PE E      O OF F      R RI IS SK K: :      … … . .
Creditworthiness of counterpart: Based on rating agency evaluations, such as S&P.
Absolute default measure:  No. of times within a year that the counterpart has defaulted.
Relative value of default:  If 100% is the totality of defaults in the year, the relative value of default defines
the percentage at which the counterpart has defaulted during the year.3.1.1.3 Mapping of risks
Once risks have been analysed, they can be mapped on the basis of the three previously-
mentioned criteria; the frequency, the duration and the scale. The following graph shows an
example of mapping credit, liquidity and systemic risk and assumptions have been made on
their relative frequency, scale and duration
64.
GRAPH 1: MAPPING OF RISKS
The mapping of exposures achieves importance when risks have to be prioritised (see following
section for details).
3.1.1.4 Prioritisation of risks
The prioritisation of risks provides a view of the importance overseers attach to different
exposures. This can be done according to the pattern each exposure has, i.e. according to the
significance of its frequency, duration or scale, and on the basis of the extent risks are
mitigated. Prioritisation enables overseers to select those risks which need to be monitored
more closely and more frequently in order to be in a position to react promptly when
appropriate.
Due to the fact that overseers are interested in an acceptable level of risks, "full risk weights"
and "derived risk weights" can represent a tool to prioritise exposures. The "full risk weight"
might define the significance of the risk's scale, frequency and duration. For example,
exposures which have a high frequency, scale and duration, might have a high full risks weight,









Credit risk might have a lower
frequency than liquidity risk, but
higher scale and duration.
Liquidity risk
It is probable that liquidity risk
arises with high frequency but
with a reduced scale and duration.
Systemic risk
It is probable that systemic risk
has a low frequency, but in the
event that it arises a very high
scale and a high duration.Overseers can base their assessment not only on the analysis of risks, but also on the capability
that operators and technical agents have to mitigate those exposures. Mitigation mechanisms
can in fact transform an unacceptable risk into an acceptable one. Hence, each exposure can
be seen in the light of the respective mitigation mechanism used to cover it. "Derived risk
weights" represent a correction of full risk weights on the basis of the capability each risk
mitigation technique has to reduce the exposure for which it has been developed. Certain risks
might have a high frequency, scale and duration (and hence a high full risk weight), but if they
are adequately covered by mitigation mechanisms, their derived risk weight might be
consistently lower than their full risk weight. 
The risk of the loss of a primary operational site (operational risk) might, for example, be an
exposure with a low frequency, a quite variable duration (depending on the duration of the
clearing and settlement process) and a high scale (the impact on the functioning of the system
could be quite significant). Its full risk weight might be therefore medium (average value between
a low frequency, medium duration and high scale). If nevertheless back-up and contingency
arrangements are maintained in hot-stand-by mode and processing on the secondary site can be
restarted without delays and loss of data, overseers might give a low derived risk weight to this
exposure. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the scale can be seen as the more determinant
criterion of this type of operational risk, overseers might be interested in increasing the sensitivity
of operators and/or technical agents to develop further contingency planning and infrastructure
(e.g. increase the number of secondary sites), if that is considered necessary.
As concerns systemic risk for example, as a general rule, the exposure is usually not directly
addressed by specific risk mitigation techniques and its causes might be multiple in time and
geographically. Its full and derived risk weight might therefore be high. 
A template could group all the basic information on the various types of risks, ranging from
their description to their different weights.
TEMPLATE 2: RISK WEIGHTS AND PRIORITISATION IN TERMS OF OVERSIGHT
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T TY YP PE E   O OF F   R RI IS SK K D DE ES SC CR RI IP PT TI IO ON N F FU UL LL L   R RI IS SK K   W WE EI IG GH HT T D DE ER RI IV VE ED D   R RI IS SK K    P PR RI IO OR RI IT TI IS SA AT TI IO ON N
O OF F   R RI IS SK K - -   F FR RE EQ QU UE EN NC CY Y W WE EI IG GH HT T ( (i in n   t te er rm ms s   o of f   
- -   D DU UR RA AT TI IO ON N o ov ve er rs si ig gh ht t) )
- -   S SC CA AL LE E
Credit risk …. …. …. …
Operational risk Full risk weight: medium low-medium medium
e.g. the loss of - low frequency - focus on the scale
a primary system - variable duration
- high scale
Systemic risk Full risk weight: high high high
- low frequency focus on scale
- high duration and duration
- very high scale
etc.. …. …. …. ….3.1.1.5 Market expectations
The analysis of known risks and of their future trends might not always be sufficient to
determine if and how new exposures might arise. Risk-takers, such as systems' operators or
technical agents are the entities which might best express expectations on how existing risks
might change or on how new risks might arise. Major risk-takers can be:
- operators and technical agents of overseen systems 
(operators and technical agents of overseen systems might have expectations about new
forms of operational exposures, due to the fact that they are usually involved in new
technological developments);
- operators and technical agents of non-overseen systems
(non-overseen systems might have the possibility, in future, to become overseen
infrastructures. Operators and technical agents of those systems can be in the position of
expressing an appreciation about new developments and possible future exposures.);
- remote participants 
(remote participants have knowledge of the constraints customers have to face when
participating in foreign systems and might have expectations about how certain cross-border
risks could be better mitigated).
Overseers might need to handle market risk expectations carefully and eventually limit their use
due to the fact that those variables can be very volatile, can change significantly in a short time-
frame, are mostly subjective and hence only partly reliable. 
3.1.2 Assessment tools
Assessment tools complement the set of mechanisms which overseers have at their disposal to
assess risks and their potential impact on payment and securities settlement and to evaluate the
adequacy of risk mitigation techniques used in this context. 
Mitigation mechanisms can be divided according to three criteria: 
- nature; 
The nature of a mechanism defines the extent to which it mitigates different exposures.
Mitigation techniques can have a multi-functional or a mono-functional nature. Multi-
functional mechanisms cover more than one risk, while mono-functional mechanisms cover
one specific exposure;
- adequacy; 
The adequacy of a mechanism defines its capability of significantly reducing the scale, the
duration and the frequency of the exposure(s) for which the mitigation technique has been
developed;
51- costs;
The cost of a mitigation mechanism defines the cost for the operator or technical agent of
developing and implementing the mitigation technique. Certain mechanisms can be
expensive to develop and to be implemented compared to the benefits in terms of risk
mitigation they enable; others might be more cost-effective in their scope. As a general rule,
multi-functional tools may be more cost-effective, while mono-functional ones might be quite
expensive if they have to be developed to cover a specific exposure with a low frequency of
materialisation. 
Market practitioners sometimes decide to grandfather exposures in order to be able to
maintain a balance between the costs of implementing mitigation mechanisms and the costs
of bearing a risk. Due to the fact that the market might have a less risk-adverse attitude
compared to overseers and be less involved in the reduction of systemic risk, risk-takers might
be biased in evaluating the need to develop and implement those techniques. 
The costs of implementing mitigation mechanisms represent one of the major factors which
increase the resistance of operators and/or technical agents to the maximisation of risk
controls. Other factors, which can increase this resistance, can include a false belief that the
system operated might be "too big to fail" and a biased evaluation of the existing exposures
under a risk-taking attitude which leads to a constant underestimation of risks.
In assessing mitigation techniques two further issues can be of importance. First, a change in
the pattern of risks, due for example to new technological developments, might cause the
obsolescence of the corresponding existing mitigation technique(s). This can further result in a
need to adapt the current mitigation mechanism to the changed exposure
65 or to revise
mitigation procedures periodically. Second, the use of a mitigation technique, which is targeting
a specific exposure, might, as a possible side-effect, increase an existing risk or create a new
type of exposure
66. If a negative correlation between various types of risks exists, it might be
difficult for operators or technical agents to cover one exposure without increasing at the same
time another one. This, in turn, develops further their resistance to maximising risk controls. 
The following sections give an overview on the different criteria overseers can implement to
assess mitigation mechanisms. 
3.1.2.1 Effectiveness of mitigation mechanisms
Mitigation techniques can have, inter alia, the goal of reducing the losses a counterpart incurs
when a risk materialises in a transaction failure. The effectiveness of a mitigation mechanism
defines its capability to reduce:
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65 The introduction of e-payments and e-money represent an example. Mitigation procedures currently used in order to ensure the
reliability of settlement data might need to be reviewed in the light of new techniques, such as cryptography or public key
infrastructure - PKI. 
66 E.g. an SSS can use DvP model 3 settlement to cover credit risk. If a link exists between a DvP model 3 and a DvP model 1, liquidity
risk might be increased.- the probability at which an exposure materialises - preventive measures - (e.g. the use of real-
time gross settlement mitigates credit risk or the use of a CCP reduces counterpart's risk);
- the losses a counterpart incurs when an exposure materialises in a transaction failure -
corrective measures - (e.g. through the use of insurance coverage).
As a general rule, preventive measures reduce the frequency at which exposures arise.
Corrective measures on the other hand focus on the reduction of the scale and the duration of
risks. The more a risk mitigation technique is effective in its scope, the more its derived risk
weight will be possibly limited in value. 
3.1.2.2 Nature of mitigation mechanisms
A cross-check matrix can be used to identify the nature of mitigation techniques (mono- or
multi-functional) on one hand and the extent to which current mitigation mechanisms cover the
existing exposures. Matrix 1 gives an example of how the market might grandfather some
exposures under a risk-taking attitude.
MATRIX 1: CROSS-CHECK  MATRIX
CR= Credit risk; LR= Liquidity risk; OR= Operational risk; SBF= Settlement bank failure risk; CSR= Custody risk; UCL=
Unsecured credit lines (clean risk); SY= Systemic risk.
3.1.2.3 Availability of contingency mechanisms
All types of systems might be faced with contingency situations; hence overseers might need to
assess the availability of contingency mechanisms, i.e. to which extent a system and its
contingency mechanisms can cope with distress. For this reason: 
- contingency mechanisms should be tested regularly by operators or technical agents. As
concerns operational risk for example, risk-takers are usually undertaking ongoing tests and
developing different disaster scenarios to ensure a timely recovery of processing within an
adequate period of time. Concerning liquidity risk, operators or technical agents might have
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R RI IS SK K C CR R L LR R O OR R S SB BF F C CS SR R U UC CL L S SY Y   e et tc c. .
M MI IT TI IG GA AT TI IO ON N
T TE EC CH HN NI IQ QU UE E      
Back-up arrangements X? X
Contingency plans X? X
Real-time settlement X? X
DvP procedures X? X
Central bank money X? X
CCP ?X
Collateralisation X? X





etc.  ?Xin place contingency measures to raise finance on the market in case of crisis. Liquidity
contingency measures are generally tested on a regular basis in order to ensure the possibility
of promptly raising finances in case of need. 
- crisis procedures should define which are the notification and escalation procedures in case
of contingency. They should furthermore enable a co-operative framework between those
risk-takers or overseers involved in the crisis in order to co-ordinate a joint response in a short
time-frame.
Operators or technical agents might be less directly involved in the reduction of systemic risk,
which remains one of the major concerns of regulators. Hence overseers might be interested in
analysing the possibility according to which an exposure (or its materialisation) might have a
spill-over effect on other systems (systemic risk). In this analysis the following variables are of
interest:
- the time horizon of the crisis, i.e. how long is the crisis expected to last;
- the time horizon and scale of the impact, i.e. how long may the malfunctioning of the system
last due to the crisis;
- the geographical dimension of the crisis, i.e. which could be the systems hit by the crisis,
nationally and internationally.
3.1.3 Intervention tools
Intervention tools can have one of two different natures; a preventive or a corrective nature.
Preventive intervention tools enable overseers to increase the risk-adverse attitude of market
practitioners. They might include, inter alia, the use of moral suasion (for example with the goal
of enforcing changes in market practices). Corrective intervention tools enable regulators to
react promptly once an exposure has materialised and has the potential to trigger systemic risk
(for example through the issue of recommendations to enforce the application of corrective
actions envisaged by overseers). 
The following sections give an overview of the different intervention tools which might be
implemented by overseers. 
3.1.3.1 Preventing intervention tools
Improving market discipline 
Overseers have the possibility to set benchmarks, of quantitative or of qualitative nature, which
systems' operators or technical agents should respect. The benchmarks represent the trade-off
between the best practice currently in use by market practitioners, nationally and
internationally, on the one hand and, on the other hand, what would theoretically represent a
first best solution envisaged by overseers under a risk-adverse attitude.
Quantitative benchmarks for example, can be used to define a level of performance, with which
the systems and its components should comply. Qualitative benchmarks can define objectives
in terms of safety and efficiency of overseen systems. 
54Hence, the use of benchmarks can foster in the long-term both systems' safety and efficiency
and market discipline. Due to the fact that overseers best use guidelines and moral suasion
rather than prescriptions in the continuous dialogue with market practitioners, the prominent
use of qualitative benchmarks or a mixed use of both criteria might be preferred. 
Building a risk conscious culture
The practice of disclosing oversight results can add to the credibility and transparency of central
banks as overseers of payment and securities settlement systems and might enable regulators
to modify a risk-adverse culture, which, as general rule, is currently used by systems' operators
and participants. It might furthermore add to the reduction of reputational risk of market
practitioners.
Building a risk conscious culture is generally a long-term process which cannot easily be laid
down in a written procedure, but finds its roots in the constant communication with the risk-
takers and in the analysis of the feedback provided by market practitioners. The use of moral
suasion enables overseers to reduce sanctions and prescriptions and enables a better
acceptance by the market of those corrective actions which regulators might enforce in the
context of their oversight activities.
3.1.3.2 Corrective intervention tools
Implementing a procedure for crisis situations
In case of crisis, overseers might have two needs. A first need would be to identify which are
the causes of the crisis and to react as quickly as possible. A second need would be to co-
ordinate a joint response to the contingency with those entities which have been hit by the
crisis and with their respective oversight or regulatory institutions. This might achieve particular
importance if the crisis has gained or has the potential to gain a cross-border dimension and
might impact, or already have had effects on other systems beside the one directly involved in
the contingency. 
Hence, overseers might need to develop a contingency procedure with the goal of enabling a
quick response to crisis and to exceptional circumstances. The contingency procedure(s) might
be defined as a standardised protocol which permits overseers to make a first assessment of the
crisis in a short-time frame. On the basis of the information acquired from market practitioners,
regulators might define a follow-up to the situation and further develop a concrete action plan
when considered necessary.
To ensure a timely reaction in case of contingency, a number of staff of regulators and market
practitioners might need to intervene promptly. A contingency database could therefore
include: 
- the details of the oversight staff to be contacted in case of contingency (names of the staff
members, phone numbers, fax numbers and e-mail address, etc.);
55- the details of the staff of operators and technical agents of overseen systems to be contacted
in case of contingency;
- the details of the staff of other regulatory bodies responsible for those systems which might
be directly or indirectly hit by the crisis
67; 
- the details of the notification and escalation procedures within institutions exercising
oversight functions.
Contingency procedures might define a priori the timing and the location at which a joint
meeting between regulators
68 might be organised.
TABLE 1: PROCEDURE FOR CRISIS SITUATIONS
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1 1   F Fr ra am me ew wo or rk k   f fo or r   c co o- -o op pe er ra at ti io on n
- Details of the oversight staff to be
contacted in case of contingency
- Details of the operator's and technical
agents' staff of overseen systems to be
contacted in case of contingency
- Details of the staff of other regulatory
bodies, which might be involved in the
oversight of the concerned system(s), to
be contacted in case of contingency
2 2 C Co on ns su ul lt ta at ti io on n   p pr ro oc ce ed du ur re e
Organisation of a meeting between
contact persons of the oversight
institution, other regulatory bodies
involved and operators and technical
agents of overseen systems 
3 3 N No ot ti if fi ic ca at ti io on n   p pr ro oc ce ed du ur re e
Reporting to the management of the
overseer
4 4 E Es sc ca al la at ti io on n   p pr ro oc ce ed du ur re e
Overseer's internal decision taking process
5 5 J Jo oi in nt t   d de ec ci is si io on n- -t ta ak ki in ng g   p pr ro oc ce es ss s
Discussion of the action plan 
6 6 E En nf fo or rc ce em me en nt t   p pr ro oc ce ed du ur re e
Implementation of the action plan


















Definition of the contact persons available in
case of contingency.
In case the first person is not available, the
second on the list will be contacted.
In case the first person is not available, the
second on the list will be contacted.
In case the first person is not available, the
second on the list will be contacted.
In case of contingency, a meeting between
regulators and market practitioners might be
promptly organised at the premises "XY" if
possible, otherwise at the premises "YZ". In
case of need, the use of teleconference/video-
conference should be considered.
Reporting to the management of the overseer
on the result of the meeting between
operators, technical agents and regulators on
the causes of the crisis. 
Decision on how to follow-up and definition
of an action plan to be implemented.
Discussion of the action plan with the other
regulators involved. Finalisation of the action
plan.
Enforcement of the action plan, and
communication of the corrective actions to
the overseen systems concerned.
Assessment of the results achieved by
enforcing the corrective actions and
evaluation if further corrective actions are
needed. The assessment can be done by the
overseer separately or jointly with the other
regulators involved in the contingency,
depending on the situation.
N No o. .   T Ta as sk ks s R Re es sp po on ns si ib bl le e
p pe er rs so on n
D De et ta ai il ls s
.
67 Systems which are directly linked one to the other, have a potential to trigger systemic disruptions; hence a co-operation between the
authorities responsible for overseeing different entities linked one to the other might be of help. E.g., due to the fact that CBL is
directly linked to EOC through the night-time bridge, the Belgium and the Luxembourg overseers might co-operate in case a crisis hits
the bridge processing. 
68 Regulators are referred to as the different authorities responsible for overseeing the system(s) which have been hit by the contingency.In the long run, overseers might need to consult with market practitioners, in the light of the
crisis, on:
- the need to review contingency or crisis management procedures of operators and technical
agents; and
- if the pattern of external or internal threats are in the process of changing and what might
be the implications.
3 3. .2 2   R Ri is sk k   m ma an na ag ge em me en nt t   a an nd d   o ov ve er rs si ig gh ht t
As concerns risk management, overseers have the goal of assessing how systems manage and
systematically identify vulnerabilities and of evaluating the impact of risks and risk
materialisation on systems' processing. Overseers might lay down the whole process in a "risk
management action plan". 
3.2.1 Risk management action plan
The "risk management action plan" has the aim of defining in a written procedure which goals
overseers have when assessing risk management in the context of payment and securities
settlement systems, of defining which corrective actions might be undertaken as concerns
existing risks and how to follow-up those corrective actions. It includes therefore a policy
statement, goals and objectives, monitoring and evaluation procedures and tools, risk
management cost/benefit analysis, etc.. 
The easiest way to proceed in the construction of a risk management action plan, might consist
in the definition of oversight objectives as concerns the assessment of risk mitigation and risk
management implemented by overseen entities, followed by the description of the oversight
tools used to assess risks and mitigation techniques currently in use on the concerned market
and what can be the level of transparency overseers want to adopt as concerns their assessment
results. 
The structure of the risk management action plan can be as follows:
1. Oversight objective(s) 
Oversight objectives define the aim of overseers as concerns risk mitigation and risk
management implemented by operators and technical agents. This aim can be formulated
under the form of a policy statement, such as:
The purpose of assessing systems' risk mitigation and risk management is, inter alia, to
contribute to the systematic and comprehensive identification and prevention of those risks
which could arise in payment and securities settlement systems and of those risks the
operator and/or technical agent is exposed to by virtue of its activities, followed by the
evaluation of the availability and adequacy of the risk mitigation techniques used by overseen
entities. One of its priorities is to enforce the reduction of systemic risk. 
57The oversight process includes in its focus not only the operator or the technical agent as
themselves, but also the parent company as the subsidiaries eventually, branches and
representative offices, where such have a bearing on risk and potentially an impact on
payment, payment-related systems or securities settlement systems and financial stability. 
2. Oversight tools
This section can describe those tools overseers might adopt or have adopted to analyse the
concerned overseen systems, such as:
- Research tools:
 evaluation (identification and analysis) of exposures;
 prioritisation of risks;
 analysis of risk expectations, etc.. 
- Assessment tools:
 establishment of a cross-check matrix;
 assessment of the effectiveness of mitigation mechanisms ;
 assessment of the availability of mitigation mechanisms, etc..
-Intervention tools:
 improvement of market discipline; 
 implementation of a procedure for crisis situations, etc..
3. Assessment report
The assessment report will include the results of the analysis of the risks and mitigation
techniques undertaken by overseers and the follow-up of issues still open. (The third annex
gives an overview on how the evaluation of an exposure could be made according to the
methodology developed in this chapter.)
4. Transparency framework as concerns assessment results
The assessment overseers make of the capability of payment and securities settlement
systems' operators have to mitigate and adequately manage risks, is usually limited to those
entities which are subject to their respective oversight framework. Similar exposures, which
arise in the context of nationally overseen risk-taking institutions might arise in other systems
which are located in other countries and are subject to a different oversight framework.
Cross-border experiences might show how certain types of exposures can be more
adequately covered within other jurisdictions or through different system designs. They might
furthermore highlight new types of exposures and new forms of mitigation techniques.
Hence a communication between overseers of different systems could provide further
information on how to better enforce risk management and risk mitigation on the market
concerned. 
58Besides communications with regulatory entities, communications with overseen institutions
and with market practitioners more generally open an ongoing consultation process with
risk-takers at national and international level.
The need for overseers to be transparent in their assessment results might be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis according to the situation and to the need of the regulators. It could be
rather broad in scope and in target; e.g. through the disclosure of the oversight assessment
results to the general public if the system's operator does not comply with corrective actions
set out by the overseer; or, rather limited in scope and target, e.g. through the discussion of
the assessment results with operators and technical agents when considered of need. 
This approach shifts the traditional view of risk management based on quantitative measures
to the use of communication between risk-takers and risk-mitigating entities as a tool to
enforce a risk-adverse culture between market practitioners. Risk-takers represent the
individuals, which need to find a balance between market demand by systems' participants
and the risk-adverse approach of the overseen community. 
3.2.2 Reiteration process
The oversight of payment and securities settlement systems can be defined as an ongoing
process which finds its major root in the developments overseen systems are or can be subject
to. The results of the evaluations overseers undertake, can be communicated to risk-takers
when considered necessary. The feed-back provided by the market might in turn influence the
oversight framework. This mechanism can be referred to as reiteration. 
The process starts with the identification of system's functions, boundaries and areas of
responsibility through the study of its internal rules and procedures, legal and regulatory
framework, followed by the identification of the internal and external threats to the system and
the analysis of the existing and potential exposures. The evaluation of the scale, frequency and
duration of risks gives an appreciation on which exposures might need to be targeted with
priority and enables overseers to further evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the existing
risk control measures currently in use. This permits in turn the evaluation of the extent residual
systems' vulnerabilities exist, identifying corrective actions, enforcing them and reassessing the
eventual residual exposures. 
The reiteration mechanism is usually a long-term process which could easily be incorporated
into the risk management action plan.
594 Conclusions
Overseers' task is to contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and securities settlement
systems and in this way to reduce systemic risk. Risk-takers, such as operators or technical
agents of overseen systems, have also an interest in reducing and managing the different
exposures which arise in the context of those systems they operate. 
As concerns operators, technical agents and participants, their interest in mitigating exposures
can be of differing nature and extent. Risk-takers can be faced with the need to find a balance
between their business needs, the market demand and the risk-adverse attitude adopted by
overseers. Hence, overseers might need to consider, when assessing the capability of operators
and technical agents to fully mitigate risks, what would theoretically represent a first best
solution under a risk-adverse attitude and what represents currently best or sound practice on
the market. 
The philosophy behind this evaluation expresses on one hand the need for overseers to ask for
the elimination of those exposures which are not adequately mitigated by market practitioners.
On the other hand it highlights the possibility to grandfather certain exposures without
necessarily eliminating them in case the respective mitigation techniques can adequately
transform an unacceptable risk into an acceptable one.
Overseers' major interest relates to the systems' soundness, safety and efficiency. Their aim is
to reduce the possibility that an overseen system might fail. For this reason overseers attach
importance to the identification and analysis of the different exposures which could arise within
those systems they oversee and to evaluate under what circumstances new risks could arise. The
way in which they might perform this task can be various. The text provides a framework to
help overseers to dynamically assess the availability and appropriateness of risk control
measures and to evaluate how market practice currently respects the objectives set by
regulators in terms of systems' safety and efficiency. 
This framework includes two major issues.
The first issue refers to the development of different types of tools which overseers could
equally implement in the context of payment or of securities settlement systems, and which
might enable them to assess how risk-takers mitigate exposures. The tools have been divided
into research, assessment and intervention tools according to their scope. The instruments are
of both qualitative and quantitative nature, and their use permits, inter alia, the evaluation of
current market practices and eventually the need to influence them when they consistently
differ from the objectives overseers have. For this reason, overseers might be interested in
maintaining a constant dialogue with risk-takers and in assessing whenever the feedback
provided by the market might have an impact on their oversight framework. 
The second issue refers to the development of crisis procedures to enable overseers to intervene
in case a risk materialises in a systemically important failure. The procedure for crisis
management has been shaped in such a way that it can be implemented in different
60contingency situations and which foresees eventually the possibility to organise a joint response
to the crisis between the authorities involved in the oversight of those systems hit by the same
contingency. 
Both issues can be regrouped into a risk management action plan with the aim of defining, in
written procedures:
(i) which risks currently arise in overseen systems and the way they are mitigated;
(ii) which risks overseers consider not to be adequately mitigated by operators
and  technical agents;
(iii) in which way they want to follow-up on still open questions; and 
(iv) the level of transparency they want to adopt as concerns their oversight results.
Hence, the aim of assessing risks and risk mitigation techniques in the context of central bank
oversight of payment and securities settlement systems can be defined as an ongoing process
which finds its major root in the developments overseen systems are or can be subject to, and
finds one of its major reasons in the developments overseers might achieve in terms of safety
and efficiency within the systems they oversee.
615 Glossary
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E EX XP PL LA AN NA AT TI IO ON N
A pair of transactions that requires a counterpart to receive and redeliver the same
securities on the same day. In providing liquidity to the market often dealers buy and sell
the same security for the same settlement date. 
Transaction between two counterpart members in different ICSDs 
Cash management services include fund transfers, overdraft facilities, etc..
The Central Securities Depository is the depository for national assets.
Safekeeping and administration of securities and financial instruments on behalf of
participants of an SSS.
Inability of an entity to meet its obligations.
Direct membership of a participant in a CSD.
Bonds issued by a borrower outside the domestic market, denominated in a Eurocurrency,
underwritten and sold by an international syndicate of financial institutions. The securities
are generally listed but not traded. They are not subject to tax and other registration
requirements of any national market. 
Transaction with a counterpart in a foreign market.
Non-settlement of a transaction.
Finality is achieved when the transaction cannot be reversed in accordance with the rules
and procedures of the settlement system. When finality is reached the acquirer of the
securities achieves an enforceable interest in the securities object of the transaction.
The global custodian uses a local agent as sub-custodian which is member of the CSD in
the country of issue of the security.
Gridlock occurs when two or more payment queues are blocked due to shortage of funds.
The amount by which the value of the collateral provided to back a transaction is reduced
to cover fluctuations in the market price of the securities concerned. 
The International Central Securities Depository is a depository for international assets.
Transaction between two accounts hold at the same CSD/SSS.
Local bank which is member of the CSD in the country of issue of the security.
The central system organisation providing products and services.
A public policy activity principally intended to promote the safety and efficiency of
payment and securities settlement capabilities and in particular to reduce systemic risk.
The SSS provides for the effective cash transfer (payment) of a settled operation. The
payment can be processed on a gross or a net basis either directly through central bank
accounts or through one or more private settlement banks.
Where the SSS acts as depository, it enables participants to deposit with it the securities
for which the SSS has a direct and unique relationship with the issuer. The SSS records the
relationship of the securities on behalf of its participants and manages the relationship
with the issuer. 
Account opened subsequently to the opening of the customer's main account. Each CBL
account includes both a cash and securities sub-component.
Systemic risk is the risk that the inability of one institution to meet its obligations when
due will cause other institutions to fail to meet their obligations when due. The possibility
that the liquidity and credit problems precipitated by these failures to perform will disrupt
financial markets and impair the functioning of payment and securities settlement is of
particular concern.
A supplier of service where an operator has located a significant portion of its operational
or IT infrastructure or where several payment- or securities settlement-related operational
or IT infrastructures are centralised.6 Glossary of abbreviations
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Automated Securities Lending








Centre de transferts électroniques
Clearstream International
Central Securities Depository





European System of Central Banks
First-in-first-out
Free of payment
Interest Bancshares Corporation Class A
Internal Credit Group
International Central Securities Depository
Information Technology
Luxembourg Interbank Payment System
National Central Bank
Public Key Infrastructure
Place of the Relevant Intermediary Approach
Real-time Gross Settlement System
Standard and Poor's
Securities Lending and Borrowing Syndicate
Strategic Securities Lending
Securities Settlement System
Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
Groupement pour la promotion et la gestion des systèmes de paiement au Luxembourg
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System
Tripartite Financing Facility
Technical Overdraft Limit7 Bibliography
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658 First annex: Payment and securities settlement 
8 8. .1 1   S Se ec cu ur ri it ti ie es s   s se et tt tl le em me en nt t   
T Tr ra ad de e   c co on nf fi ir rm ma at ti io on n
The first step in settling a securities trade is to ensure that the two counterparts in the
transaction, the buyer and the seller of the security, agree on the terms of the transaction,
which is defined as trade confirmation. Depending on the trading mechanisms adopted, the
trade confirmation will be done in different ways. Within an electronic trading system for
example, the system itself produces the confirmation of the terms of the trade between the two
counterparts, otherwise the terms are generally confirmed by the stock exchanges based on the
data that the counterparts submit. 
In case a broker-dealer or a member of the stock exchange
69 takes the roles of intermediary in
a transaction on behalf of the original counterparts
70, the trade confirmation might occur in two
separate stages. The first part occurs between the two direct market participants, while the
second part occurs between each direct market participant and the respective original
counterpart on which behalf it is acting. Counterpart risk is reduced the earlier the trade
confirmation is achieved and the earlier discrepancies will be detected. Once this task has been
performed, the intermediaries have to create instructions for the positioning of funds and
securities, which will be matched within the SSS prior to the settlement date. Credit risk is
reduced the shorter the settlement cycles will be. 
C Cl le ea ar ri in ng g   a an nd d   s se et tt tl le em me en nt t
After the confirmation of the terms of the trade has occurred, clearing and settlement takes
place. 
Clearing involves the calculation of the obligation of the counterparts. This process can be done
on a gross basis, which implies that the calculation is done trade by trade, or on a net basis,
which implies that the calculation of the position will be done in terms of the net outstanding
credit or debit position towards the counterpart in the trade (bilateral netting) or towards all
the counterparts in all the trades (multilateral netting). The netting is mostly common on
securities markets where the volumes of trades are high with the goal to manage liquidity
better and to reduce gross exposures. 
66
.
69 Either the broker-dealer or the member of the stock exchange or in this case direct market participants.
70 The buyer and the seller of the security will be in this case indirect market participants.The settlement involves the final transfer of securities and funds respectively to the buyer and
to the seller. The dematerialisation of securities permits that settlement is performed without
physical movement of the holding through a book-entry mechanism. Once the payment and the
delivery have been made, the settlement process will be completed. Nevertheless legally, an
additional step has to be fulfilled before finality can be achieved. Settlement systems generally
keep registries in which the ownership of securities is listed in the records of the issuer.
Securities may be registered in the name of a broker-dealer or custodian (indirect holding
system) or in the name of the ultimate owner (direct holding system). The change in ownership
recorded in the register permits finality to be legally achieved. 
S Se et tt tl le em me en nt t   o of f   c cr ro os ss s- -b bo or rd de er r   t tr ra ad de es s
The settlement of cross-border trades takes place outside of the country in which one or both
of the counterparts involved in the transaction are located. A common example is the
processing of Eurobonds which is usually performed through ICSDs such as EOC and CBL. The
channels to settle cross-border may vary depending on the type of security to be processed.
A first option requires that a non-resident counterpart achieves membership in the settlement
system within the country where the security has been issued. This channel might nevertheless
not be available for all non-resident institutions. If direct membership is not allowed, local
agents can usually gain access to the country of issue of the security. The agent will be a direct
member in the local CSD and will offer settlement and related services to the non-resident
counterpart. Settlement services in different markets can be furthermore provided by global
custodians, which have an own network of sub-custodians. ICSDs on the other hand, offer
settlement for a wide range of securities and currencies and have developed links to a number
of local CSDs. 
8 8. .2 2   P Pa ay ym me en nt t   s se et tt tl le em me en nt t   
The submission, the validation by the system, the acceptance for settlement of the instruction
and the settlement with finality represent the statuses of a payment instruction.
The submission involves that the details of the payment (details on the beneficiary and the
sender, amount to be transferred, etc.) are transmitted to the payment system on or before the
value date. The payment system subsequently validates the instruction. In an RTGS system the
settlement is achieved immediately, while for net systems, the positions are first netted and
settled during the defined settlement cycle(s). Once the settlement account of the beneficiary
of the transaction within the payment system is credited, the settlement is unconditional and
irrevocable. 
67R Ro ou ut ti in ng g   o of f   d do om me es st ti ic c   p pa ay ym me en nt ts s   w wi it th hi in n   L LI IP PS S- -G Gr ro os ss s
After a payment has been inputted in the system and validated, the payment is intercepted by
SWIFT FIN-Copy which sends a settlement request to the BCL. The latter in turn debits the
account of the sender subject to sufficient credit available and credits the account of the
receiver of the payment. If sufficient credit is not available, the BCL informs the participant of
the lack of funds.
R Ro ou ut ti in ng g   o of f   c cr ro os ss s- -b bo or rd de er r   p pa ay ym me en nt ts s   w wi it th hi in n   L LI IP PS S- -G Gr ro os ss s
Outgoing TARGET cross-border payments are settled like domestic payments within LIPS-Gross.
The payment message has to be addressed to the BIC address of the BCL which will in turn
forward the instruction to the receiving NCB. In case no sufficient credit is available, the
participant is informed. On the other hand incoming cross-border payments are forwarded by
the BCL to the receiving LIPS-Gross participant after settlement.
689 Second annex: EOC-CBL bridge agreement
The new bridge agreement between EOC and CBL was signed in March 1992 and launched in
September 1993. Since the implementation of the electronic bridge the securities transactions
have been effectuated by means of book-entry transfers. Both EOC and CBL systems maintain
a securities and a cash account with the other. The following figure shows the mechanics of the
settlement process.
FIGURE 1: MULTIPLE OVERNIGHT PROCESSING EOC-CBL
Source: BIS, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks
of the Group of Ten countries, Cross-border securities settlement, March 1995
A A: :   The processing starts with a first delivery done by CBL (at 20:30 CET at the latest). CBL
maximises internal and bridge deliveries given CBL participants' securities, cash holdings and/or
available cash and securities borrowing facilities. Once the system has checked that the
participant has liquidity available for delivery to EOC, his securities account will be provisionally
debited and his cash account provisionally credited. Those funds are marked as "unconfirmed
funds" and can be used within the limits of the unconfirmed funds facility, which implies that
CBL permits customers to use incoming cash prior to confirmation that CBL has received the
funds. The securities on the other hand, even if provisionally credited, can be used as collateral.
EOC's transit securities account at CBL is provisionally credited and EOC's transit cash account
at CBL is provisionally debited. The proposed delivery instructions are then sent to EOC after
the first settlement batch is completed at CBL (at 22:00 CET at the latest).
B B: :   EOC tries also to maximise deliveries given availability of liquidity. If an EOC's participant has
enough cash at disposal to accept a proposed delivery from CBL's participant, his cash and his
securities account will be debited/credited provisionally. On the other hand, CBL's transit cash
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Run 3 Run 5provisionally debited. During the same settlement cycle, a proposal for deliveries to CBL is
prepared. At the end of the cycle, EOC sends the feedback on the proposed deliveries by CBL
in the first run and its own proposed deliveries (at 23:30 CET at the latest).
C C: :   As soon as CBL receives the feedback on accepted bridge deliveries, they become final and
the provisionality is removed from CBL participant's accounts, from CBL's and EOC's transit
securities and cash accounts. Book-entries were already final when done during the first run.
From this moment the letter of credit covers the resulting inter-system exposure. On the basis
of the new securities and cash positions of its participants, CBL tries to maximise again the
settlement of remaining unsettled internal and bridge transactions and provides for a feedback
on EOC's delivery proposal. According to the same principles the next cycle (D D) is performed.
Failed instructions are re-entered in the following run. 
E E: :   During the last run CBL tries to settle proposed bridge deliveries from EOC depending on the
liquidity availability of CBL's participants. Due to the fact that no other run can be finalised
during the same night, any new provisional book-entries relating to CBL deliveries to EOC for
the same value date remain outstanding until the next night-time cycle, when the instructions
will be inputted in the first run by CBL. Those unsettled instructions are called backlog. Since
the provisional book-entries are irrevocable, CBL's participants cannot cancel backlogs.
Backlogs do not arise in the case of EOC.
7010 Third annex: An example of the assessment of principal risk
in a generic securities settlement system
1 10 0. .1 1   B Ba as si ic c   a as ss su um mp pt ti io on ns s
This example gives an appreciation of how a risk borne by a generic securities settlement system
can be assessed using the framework which has been developed in Chapter II. The basic
assumption made in this context is that the SSS used in the example settles high transaction
volumes through  a DvP model 1 batch procedure. The SSS provides for safekeeping, custody
and settlement services to its customer-base and serves several local markets around the world.
In order to enhance the settlement of participants' transactions, the SSS, which is embedded
with a payment system, furthermore supplies credit and securities lending and borrowing
facilities which are backed by a syndicate of guarantors. The syndicate manages the valuation
of securities' haircuts, bears principal risk and manages new collateral admissions. SSS's
transactions are, as a general rule, fully collateralised but exceptions can be made for highly
creditworthy customers to which uncollateralised credit lines might be granted on a short-term
basis. Access criteria to the SSS are also based on the creditworthiness of participants. The
system's operator furthermore has in place loss-sharing arrangements in case a participant
defaults on its obligations and in case transactions are erroneously booked.
1 10 0. .2 2   D De ef fi in ni it ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   e ex xp po os su ur re e: :   p pr ri in nc ci ip pa al l   r ri is sk k   ( (c cr re ed di it t   r ri is sk k) )
Credit risk represents the possibility that a counterpart does not fulfil its obligations for the full
value, either at the due time or at any time thereafter. It can be subdivided into replacement
cost risk and principal risk. Principal risk relates to the possibility that the counterpart defaults
on its obligations once the transfer of funds or securities has begun but has not yet been
completed.
1 10 0. .3 3   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   t to oo ol ls s
10.3.1 Identification of principal risk 
The analysis of the life-cycle of a securities transaction highlights:
- the moment in time at which principal risk arises;
Principal risk arises when one party in the transaction has fulfilled its obligations and lasts
until the counterpart has fulfilled its respective obligations.
- the nature of the obligations of counterparts;
The two counterparts in the transaction have the obligation to respectively sell/pay for the
security object of the trade for the amount and the price defined and deliver/pay at the
settlement date defined. The operator of the system is responsible for the calculation of the
bilateral obligations of the counterparts, for the settlement of the instruction and for the
settlement of the cash and securities leg of the transaction.
7110.3.2 Analysis of principal risk
Principal risk can be analysed according to three criteria; its scale, its duration and its frequency. 
- Scale of principal risk
The scale of exposures gives an understanding of the severity of risks and therefore also of
the potential impact on the system's functioning, if such risks materialise.
When a counterpart defaults, all transactions to or from that customer are blocked;
nevertheless other customers waiting for payments coming from the defaulting party might
incur in liquidity or credit risk. The defaulting counterpart can incur credibility losses and
financial losses due to the non-fulfilment of its obligations. The non-defaulting counterpart
on the other hand can incur losses depending on the possibilities it has to access credit
facilities or securities lending programmes and the costs related to those facilities. The losses
incurred by the both counterparts are usually proportionate to the value of the original
contract. Hence the scale of principal risk seems to be high.
- Duration of settlement risk 
The duration of exposures identifies the moment in time at which the exposures materialise
and the point in time at which they extinguishes.
Principal risk arises when one party in the transaction has fulfilled its obligations and lasts
until the counterpart has fulfilled its respective obligations. The moment in time at which one
counterpart can default on its obligations can be defined by the moment in time at which its
transfer of cash or securities has achieved finality. In the same way, when the corresponding
payment has achieved finality, the counterpart does not incur further principal risk. For both
transaction legs, the delivery and the payment leg, the moment in time at which finality is
achieved is followed by an identification period during which the counterparts' obligations
are already final but both customers have still to identify whether or not they have received
the transfer or the payment. Every change in the timing at which each counterpart is expected
to fulfil its obligations can have an impact on the exposure's duration. Hence the duration of
principal risk seems to be medium.
- Frequency of principal risk
The frequency of exposures relates to the frequency at which the exposures arise and at
which they materialise.
Each time one party in a transaction has discharged its obligations before the counterpart has
discharged its respective obligations, principal risk arises. Due to the fact that the SSS
implements DvP model 1 procedure, which implies that the transfer of funds and securities is
carried out simultaneously, the frequency at which the exposure arises seems to be low. 
Regarding the frequency at which principal risk materialises, the analysis of customers’
creditworthiness might show that the less creditworthy counterparts are usually the ones
which default on their obligations (i.e. in general they have a higher probability of going
72bankrupt). Nevertheless other reasons are usually more significant in explaining why
customers default on their obligations, which implies that their transaction might settle late
or not settle at all. These reasons refer usually to operational mistakes made by customers
when formatting the transaction orders on one hand, while on the other hand they refer to
mistakes customers make when planning their liquidity needs. Counterparts might, for
example, forget to pre-advise an incoming payment on their account or forget to check their
credit line limit and input transaction orders which are in value higher than the credit line at
their disposal, etc.. Furthermore, for SSSs with high turnover numbers, the rate at which
transactions fail to settle is usually quite low compared to the total number of transactions
settled by the system during the day.
The rate of counterparts' default seems to be limited and not necessarily linked to the
creditworthiness of the counterparts. Hence the frequency at which settlement risk
materialises seems to be low.
10.3.3 Mapping of principal risk
(The mapping of a risk achieves importance when done in conjunction with other exposures.)
10.3.4 Prioritisation of principal risk
Principal risk can be prioritised according to the relative importance overseers give to this
exposure. The "full" risk weight of principal risk defines the significance of the exposure's scale,
duration and frequency, while its "derived" risk weight defines the capability of the existing
mitigation techniques the SSS implements to reduce principal risk.
- Full risk weight
The characteristics of principal risk can be defined as: high scale, medium duration and low
frequency. Hence its full risk weight could be defined as medium.
- Derived risk weight
Principal risk can arise either in securities transactions (if one of the counterparts does not
fulfil its obligations) or when the SSS provides for credit facilities to its participants. As
concerns securities transactions, principal risk is mitigated by the fact that the SSS implements
model 1 DvP. As concerns credit facilities, principal risk remains partly uncovered in the
following situations:
 The SSS offers credit facilities to enable a smooth settlement. The mitigation techniques used
in this context are based on the creditworthiness of counterparts rather than on the amount
of collateral provided to cover each single transaction. Certain facilities, such as credit lines,
can also be granted on an unsecured basis.
 The SSS might supply unsecured credit lines. This discretionary credit facility is provided to
participants on the basis of their level of collateralisation and on their financial standing.
Due to the fact that the decision to grant unconfirmed funds can be exercised
discretionarily, a lack of experience in the staff of the SSS might give raise to liquidity
constraints if the transaction is not settled in due time. (This in turn might give raise to a
participant's claim against the SSS itself.)
73Hence the derived risk weight of principal risk seems to be low-medium.
The mapping and prioritisation of principal risk might need to be reconsidered in the light of
the analysis of the other risks which arise within the same system.
SUMMARY TABLE
10.3.5. Market expectations as concerns principal risk 
Participants are usually those who are exposed to principal risk. The SSS itself does usually not
act as principal in securities transactions. As concerns principal risk, the following expectation
seems to prevail on the market:
- Regulators seem to point towards a reduction of the settlement cycle;
Concerning the shortening of settlement cycles, the SSS implements a batch procedure which
allows the system to receive and process trade information from different markets several
times during the day. Every additional delay depends on the settlement procedures
implemented on the local markets. As concerns internal transactions, a reduction in the
settlement cycle might not create additional constraints, because the system provides for
same-day settlement. Concerning external transactions, in which an SSS participant settles
with a foreign counterpart, the capability of the SSS to reduce the settlement cycle depends
on the settlement efficiency achieved on the local market
71. 
Hence, a reduction of the settlement cycle does not seem to entail particular constraints for
internal transactions. This result might be different for external transactions. 
74
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- -   F FR RE EQ QU UE EN NC CY Y W WE EI IG GH HT T ( (i in n   t te er rm ms s   o of f   o ov ve er rs si ig gh ht t) )
- -   D DU UR RA AT TI IO ON N
- -   S SC CA AL LE E
Principal risk Full risk weight: medium low-medium medium
- low frequency except for specific issues on which
- medium duration an intervention might be needed
- high scale (e.g. in the context of the use of
unsecured credit lines)
.
71 As a general rule, stock exchange trades have a relative short settlement cycle (money market instruments have the shortest cycle,
followed by bonds and then equities), over-the-counter traded instruments might have longer settlement cycles. 1 10 0. .4 4   A As ss se es ss sm me en nt t   t to oo ol ls s
10.4.1 Effectiveness and nature of mitigation techniques used to cover principal risk 
Several mitigation techniques are used in the SSS to cover principal risk.  As general rule, most
of the mitigation mechanisms:
- are multifunctional and therefore cost-effective;
- their nature is usually preventive, which implies that the mitigation mechanism focuses on the
reduction of the frequency at which the exposure might materialise;
- their capability to reduce exposures is quite high.
10.4.1.1Multi-functional mitigation mechanisms
a. Collateralisation of credit exposures 
Collateral is used for settlement purposes to cover participants' transactions, securities and
lending facilities and repurchase arrangements.
-nature of the mitigation technique: preventive measure;
-adequacy of the mitigation technique: high.
b. The Syndicate of Guarantors 
The syndicate manages the valuation of securities' haircuts and bears principal risk in the
context of securities lending and borrowing programmes. It furthermore manages new
collateral admissions.
-nature of the mitigation technique: preventive measure;
-adequacy of the mitigation technique: high.
c. Selection of customers based on their creditworthiness 
Access criteria to participate in the SSS are based on the creditworthiness of participants.
Creditworthiness is furthermore used as criteria to grant unsecured credit lines and to enable
the exceptional settlement of transactions even when no sufficient funds are available on the
participant's account.
-nature of the mitigation technique: preventive measure;
-adequacy of the mitigation technique: medium (even a creditworthy participant might bear
a certain risk of default).
d. Collateral valuation 
Criteria to evaluate collateral are, as a general rule, the same for the collateral used to cover
ordinary transactions and for the collateral used to cover credit or securities lending and
borrowing facilities.
-nature of the mitigation technique: preventive measure;
-adequacy of the mitigation technique: high (it reduces the exposure but does not eliminate
it in case of highly volatile financial markets).
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The use of DvP 1 reduces principal risk (in the settlement process)
- nature of the mitigation technique: preventive measure;
- adequacy of the mitigation technique: full.
10.4.2 Availability of contingency mechanisms for principal risk
All types of systems might be faced with contingency situations; hence overseers might need to
assess to which extent a system and its availability mechanisms can cope with distress. For this
reason contingency mechanisms should be tested regularly by operators or technical agents.
The concerned SSS has in place contingency mechanisms to intervene in case principal risk
materialises. 
The first mechanism enables the operator of the system, in case of default of a participant on
its obligations, to block all the accounts of the concerned participant, so that no further
settlement will be possible. Supposed that this contingency mechanism is performed manually
and the decision to implement it is taken internally by the operator's management, it does not
seem necessary for the operator to test the mechanism regularly. 
The second mechanism enables the operator, in the event that the customer has a debit balance
in a security and does not credit the account within a fixed time-delay, to purchase collateral
on the market at the expense of the defaulting customer. Nevertheless, if the purchase cannot
be made, a pro-rata reduction of the holdings of those customers, which hold the same security
in the system at the time the loss occurred, can be initiated. Furthermore, the system might
reserve the right to reverse any erroneous debit or credit entries to any account at any time.
Such errors shall include a debit or credit made in connection with a transaction which becomes
subject to a reversal order. Losses in a collective holding of a particular class of securities are to
be borne jointly and pro-rata by the co-owners of the collective holding on the basis of the
credit balance existing at the time where the loss occurred. Supposed that the participation in
loss-sharing contingency mechanisms represents a participant's obligation as usually stated in
the system's internal rules, it does not seem necessary for the operator to test the mechanism
regularly.
1 10 0. .5 5   I In nt te er rv ve en nt ti io on n   t to oo ol ls s
The intervention tools, which overseers could use to contribute to the reduction of principal
risk, are generally preventive actions. The major one can be the use of moral suasion as that
enables overseers to improve the risk-consciousness of risk-takers without being prescriptive. Its
goal could be to contribute to the:
- reduction of the use of unsecured credit lines;
- increase of the use of collateralisation;
- maintenance of records on the volume and values of participants' defaults and their reason of
default.
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